

Transcript: 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum

October 23rd, 2023



Organized by

Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC)

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China-West Dialogue (CWD)

Editor's Foreword

The [Center for China and Globalization](#) (CCG) and the [Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries](#) (CPAFFC) organized the 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing on October 23, 2023. Nearly 100 participants from think tanks across more than 20 countries and regions took part. This document is the transcript of the forum.

Section I features the welcoming addresses by:

- [WANG Huiyao](#), President, and Founder of the CCG,
- [YANG Wanming](#), President of the CPAFFC.

And special addresses by:

- [JIANG Jianguo](#), a Standing Committee member and Deputy Director of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the CPPCC National Committee, also serving as the Executive Vice President of the China Society for Human Rights Studies,
- [GAO Anming](#), Vice President, and Editor-in-Chief of the China International Communications Group.

Please note that the transcripts in Section I are provided in their original Chinese language.

Section II documents the Think Tank Leaders' Roundtable with the theme "The Global Order at A Crossroads: Ways Forward." WANG Huiyao chaired this roundtable.

Sections III and IV document the dialogues from two roundtable discussions titled "Reframing US-China Bipolar Dynamics by Pluralizing into China-West Relations," and "International Norms and Global Engagement Platforms," respectively. These sessions were co-chaired by WANG Huiyao and Colin Bradford, a Non-resident Senior Fellow of the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution and Co-Lead of the China-West Dialogue.

The video recording has been uploaded to [YouTube](#) and [WeChat](#) by CCG.



Nicki Peiyu LEE, a CCG intern and undergraduate student at China Foreign Affairs University, produced this document, which was proofread by Yuzhe HE, another CCG intern and a Master's student at the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

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I. Opening Plenary

A. Opening Remarks from the Organizers

王辉耀

全球化智库理事长、国务院原参事



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尊敬的杨万明会长、蒋建国部长、高岸明局长，

尊敬的代表们、朋友们、女士们、先生们：

大家早上好！

欢迎大家参加第八届中国全球智库创新年会。作为全球化智库理事长，我非常荣幸能够在这里作为主办方并且与伙伴们一起欢迎各位的光临。有人问我，Zoom 链接是什么，我说根本就没有，我们是线下的活动，所以，特别感谢大家能够莅临现场出席活动。

我们的世界面临着巨大的变化，今天大家齐聚一堂。国际环境在全球化方面面临很多逆风，加剧的地缘政治风险和疫情挑战，还有正在进行的一些冲突。现在面临很多挑战，其实，我们的第一个圆桌会议“十字路口的全球会议”就会讨论这些问题。当然后面的圆桌会议也会讨论很多话题。现在世界面临巨大的变化和转型，所以，我们希望能够指出前进的道路。我感到非常荣幸，能够在这里欢迎 100 多位尊贵的代表们，他们都是智库专家，包括中外 80 多家智库。

本次年会吸引了全球的关注，有很多外交使团代表、媒体、智库成员也来到现场参会。在这里我们会听到来自于中国的贵宾和领导的发言。我们知道杨会长昨天晚上宴请了部分嘉宾，我们已经进行了深入交流。所以，昨天晚上已经开始了讨论。再次感谢杨会长的接待。

未来两天日程非常满，我们会有非常多的激烈的交锋，今天我们会有圆桌会议，今天早上的话题将重点放在全球秩序上，这是非常重要的话题。全球目前的现状是什么样的，让这个领域的精英都坐在一起进行讨论。后面还会讨论中西关系，特别是探讨中美关系，怎样能够建立起这种可持续的全球互动平台，这是下午的圆桌。

上个月举行了第九届年度全球化智库论坛，邀请到中国气候变化特使解振华、美国大使、欧盟驻华大使一起讨论了三方怎样共同努力，讨论取得了丰硕的成果。明天有一个非常特殊的安排，那就是和欧洲政策中心一起合作，这个活动将带来更多的见解怎样推动中欧合作共同应对中欧挑战。

前不久，欧洲代表刚刚访问了中国，未来两天讨论非常丰富，我们身上的责任重大，同时我们也会解决共同的关切，代表们来自各方面的领导、智库领袖和专家，这是自 2019 年以来在中国举行的最大规模的一场现场讨论了，到时候大家会贡献各自的智慧，这是第一次面对面的此类对话，我们将进行诚挚的讨论和激烈的交锋。

这将极大的激励中国和全世界，我们将共同应对面临的挑战，我们希望世界能够一直沿着和平和繁荣的道路前进。所以，我再次对大家表示感谢，期待着后面与大家的卓有成效的讨论，让我们一起利用好这个机会，共同努力推动一个稳定、和谐、可持续、繁荣的未来世界。谢谢。

杨万明

中国人民对外友好协会会长



[Click here to watch the video recording of this speech.](#)

尊敬的蒋建国部长，王辉耀理事长，高岸明局长，

各位嘉宾，各位智库代表，

大家早上好!

首先，我谨代表中国人民对外友好协会，欢迎大家出席第八届中国全球智库创新年会。这是友协首次与全球化智库合作，共同举办这一年会，所以我想先介绍一下友协的情况。

中国人民对外友好协会成立于 1954 年，是一个全国性民间外交机构，在中国各省、自治区、直辖市和许多城市都设有对外友协。明年，我们将迎来友协成立 70 周年。在过去近 70 年的岁月里，友协与世界上 150 多个国家的 500 多个组织建立了交流与

合作关系，其中就有很多的智库。简单描述友协过去 70 年的工作，那就是结交朋友，深化友谊，维护和平，促进发展。

积极推动中外地方开展交流、建立友好城市关系也是友协的重要工作。截至 2023 年 9 月，中国各省、自治区、直辖市已经和五大洲 145 个国家的 590 个省（州、县、大区、道等）和 1820 个城市建立了 2950 对友好城市（省州）关系。

友协还是联合国经社理事会具有全面咨商地位的非政府组织，具有全面参与联合国举办的各领域活动的资格，传递中国民众对国际热点问题的观点和意见，提出中国人民对这些问题的看法和主张。

友协开展的国际交流活动，涉及经贸、教育、文化等各个领域。但我认为，最重要的应该是思想的交流。习近平主席说，国之交在于民相亲，民相亲在于心相通。要实现心相通，就必须在思想上引起共鸣，形成共识。在这方面，智库发挥着非常重要的作用。我希望以此次论坛为契机，加强各国智库同友协的联系和交流，增进彼此的了解和友谊，为今后的对话与合作奠定基础。

女士们，先生们，昨天晚上我有幸在中国人民对外友协接待了参加此次论坛的 16 位智库的代表，我们进行了坦诚深入、热烈的交流。通过这次交流，我想至少达成了四点共识。

第一，当今世界和平与发展、稳定与繁荣都面临着巨大的挑战，世界应当加强沟通对话与合作。

第二，经济社会的多元化发展是当今世界的主流，世界也处在多元化发展过程之中，我们应该积极地主张多边主义，特别是维护联合国的权威。

第三，加强全球治理体系的改革应当是国际议程中的重要内容，各国应加强协调合作，推动完善和健全全球治理体系和治理制度。

第四，沟通和对话是加深彼此了解推进合作的不可替代的途径，我们应该反对集团政治、集团对抗，要加强对话与沟通。

当今世界并不太平。地区冲突此起彼伏，经济复苏步履蹒跚，发展鸿沟不断拉大，自然灾害和极端天气增多，全球秩序面临诸多挑战。世界迫切需要各国智库提出应对挑战的新思路、新办法，为人类找到解决问题的新希望、新方向。我想这是论坛选择以“创新”为主题词的意义和价值所在。

10年前，习近平主席提出了构建人类命运共同体理念，呼吁国际社会坚持对话协商，建设一个持久和平的世界；坚持共建共享，建设一个普遍安全的世界；坚持合作共赢，建设一个共同繁荣的世界；坚持交流互鉴，建设一个开放包容的世界；坚持绿色低碳，建设一个清洁美丽的世界。

构建人类命运共同体理念的提出，为确立国际关系新思路、彰显全球治理新特征、开创国际交往新格局、共建美好世界新愿景提供了全新的思想指引。随后，中方又相继提出了“一带一路”倡议、全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议和全球文明倡议，进一步丰富了构建人类命运共同体理念的内涵和实践路径。

中国不仅是新理念的倡导者，更是贯彻新理念的推动者和实践家。就在5天前，第三届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛在北京成功举行。十年来，共建“一带一路”从理念化为行动、从愿景变为现实，取得了丰硕成果。

在“硬联通”方面，中老铁路、印尼雅万高铁、匈塞铁路、蒙内铁路、比雷埃夫斯港等一批标志性项目建成运营，中欧班列将亚欧大陆紧密地联系在一起。

“软联通”方面。《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》（RCEP）已对15个签署国全面生效，中国与28个国家和地区签署了21份自贸协定。

“心联通”方面。中国已与45个共建国家和地区签署高等教育学历学位互认协议，与144个共建国家签署了文化和旅游领域的合作协议。

经贸投资方面，中国与“一带一路”共建国家十年内进出口总额累计达到19.1万亿美元，年均增长6.4%；与共建国家双向投资累计超过3800亿美元，其中中国对外直接投资超过2400亿美元。

在第三届“一带一路”论坛开幕式上，习近平主席又宣布了中国支持高质量发展“一带一路”的八项行动，包括：构建“一带一路”立体互联互通网络、支持建设开放型世界经济、开展务实合作、促进绿色发展、推动科技创新、支持民间交往、建设廉洁之路和完善“一带一路”国际合作机制，再次彰显了中国致力于推动构建人类命运共同体的坚定决心。随着这些行动的落地见效，将会有更多共建国家获得快速发展的新机遇，更多民众将迎来舒适富足的新生活，推动构建人类命运共同体的努力将增添源源不断的新动能。

女士们，先生们，

两千多年前，中国古代的思想家就主张“以和为贵，和而不同”的价值取向，追求“和衷共济、和合共生”的高远理想，推崇不同国家、不同文化“美美与共、天下大同”，憧憬“大道之行，天下为公”的美好世界。

两千多年后，中国提出和落实“一带一路”倡议、推动构建人类命运共同体，也是希望通过互联互通、互利互惠，实现共同发展、合作共赢。习主席说，世界好，中国才会好；中国好，世界会更好。

同时，我们也认识到，实现构建人类命运共同体的美好愿景，是一个漫长的历史过程，需要锲而不舍、驰而不息，才能不断赢得全世界各国民众的理解和支持。智库是思想观念的创造者、政府政策的塑造者和大众观点的引导者。在座各位嘉宾都是业界翘楚，在各自研究领域具有广泛的影响力。希望大家能更加关注构建人类命运共同体这一重要理念，为丰富理念的内容、扩大理念的影响、落实理念的途径贡献真知灼见，共同为建设一个更加美好的地球村、为我们的子孙后代创造一个光明的未来而努力。

最后，我祝愿本次论坛取得圆满成功。谢谢大家！

B. Special Address

蒋建国

全国政协常委、民族和宗教委员会副主任、中国人权研究会常务副会长



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尊敬的王理事长、杨会长、高局长，

尊敬的各位朋友、各位智库同仁：

大家好！

中国人曾经用“群贤毕至，少长咸集”来描绘贤达相聚盛况，但古人应不曾想象不同肤色、不同语言、不同文化背景的贤达之士共聚一堂的景象。是全球化的力量，使这一景象在当代不断呈现、在今天再次呈现。

在上周结束的“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛上，习近平主席作了题为“建设开放包容、互联互通、共同发展的世界”的主旨演讲，指出“中国正在以中国式现代化全

面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业”，呼吁“世界现代化应该是和平发展的现代化、互利合作的现代化、共同繁荣的现代化”。当前，正处在一个充满矛盾和挑战时代，正在遭受前所未有的多重危机，地缘政治格局动荡、能源及粮食危机、气候变化、恐怖主义、跨国有组织犯罪等威胁持续存在，由此引发的全球经济增长乏力、国际社会信任赤字，加剧了全球风险和发展的不确定性。从根本上讲，这些危机也是全球人权危机，它正削弱人类共同生存和发展的基础，冲击着全人类共同价值。我们首先要做也必须要做的事情是，响应共同推动构建人类命运共同体的理念和共建“一带一路”倡议、“三大全球倡议”，汇集人类共同发展的最大公约数，形成基本共识，携手应对全球性风险和挑战，为子孙后代创造和平、发展、合作、共赢的美好未来。

第一，生存是前提。生存权是享有其他权利的前提和基础，是处于首要地位的权利。无论国际社会遭遇怎样的冲突动荡，我们必须以保障人的生存为底线，无论世界各国对于理想社会有怎样的价值观分歧，我们必须先从保障人的生存权做起。

第二，发展是钥匙。我们共同面临的许多全球性问题的根源是发展不平衡不充分。中国始终坚信，发展是推动人权事业进步的发力点和解决所有问题的总钥匙。国际社会应当通力合作，提高发展的包容性、普惠性和可持续性，在促进社会发展中实现人的个性、能力和知识的全面发展，以及人的各项权利的充分发展。

第三，平等是原则。应对全球性问题，既要尊重主权平等，也要力求实现人的平等。在动荡的国际秩序中，我们尤其要关注妇女、儿童、老年人、残疾人、难民等特定群体和各类弱势群体的权益，确保人人享有尊严和基本人权。

第四，尊重是基石。不同历史和国情，不同民族和习俗，孕育了不同文明，使世界更加丰富多彩。当前诸多全球性问题既缘于利益冲突，也缘于意识形态偏见和文明偏见。中国始终主张不同文明、不同国家之间相互尊重、相互包容、相互交流、相互借鉴。唯有抛开偏见，才可能达成共识。

为了更好形成共识，达成更有效的合作，我们需要展开真诚交流。交流增进理解，理解推动合作。从历史上看，国际秩序建立的基础，是主权国家的相互交往并由此形成的国际社会，而主权国家之间交往的先驱，往往是以贸易往来、人文交流为基本形式的民间交往。智库之间的交流与合作，是民间交往的重要形式和内容。智库上达政府、下听民意，智库交流有助于消除政治误解、缓解民意对立。智库应该成为推动民

间交流的使者、贡献真知灼见的智者、增进人类福祉的仁者，成为深化互信、凝聚共识、促进国际交往、夯实人文基础的建设者。

全球化智库（CCG）是有担当、有远见、有国际影响力的智库，近年来为国际政治、经济、文化、教育等多领域交流作出了积极贡献，中国全球智库创新年会也逐渐成为中外学者激荡思想的交流平台。

“问渠那得清如许，为有源头活水来”。希望全球化智库（CCG）把“小我”和“大我”结合起来，把国家利益和人类共同利益结合起来，以全人类的共同命运和福祉为终极关切，在鉴往知来中汲取智慧，在直面问题中展现担当，在交流合作中共同推动全球治理朝着更加公正合理的方向发展，为共同推动构建人类命运共同体贡献思想智慧和实践方法。

我的发言完了。谢谢大家!

高岸明

中国外文出版发行事业局副局长兼总编辑



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尊敬的蒋建国部长，杨万明会长，王辉耀理事长，

尊敬的各位嘉宾，各位专家，各位朋友，

大家好！

很高兴与各位新老朋友相聚在北京，共同出席第八届“中国全球智库创新年会”。

席卷全球的三年疫情已经过去，我们今天能够再次相聚北京，面对面无障碍对话交流，我感到由衷地高兴！无论线上会议工具如何发达，参会如何便捷，它永远不能代替线下面对面的交流互动。我谨代表中国外文局和中国国际传播集团，向本届年会的举办表示热烈祝贺！

一年前，中共二十大面向世界发出了“尊重世界文明多样性，以文明交流超越文明隔阂、文明互鉴超越文明冲突、文明共存超越文明优越，共同应对各种全球性挑战”

的真诚呼吁。今年 3 月，习近平主席提出“全球文明倡议”，进一步明确了中国关于不同文明包容共存、交流互鉴的主张，开启了中外文明交流互鉴的新篇章。在上周闭幕的第三届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛上，中国进一步将“深化同共建‘一带一路’国家的文明对话，加强智库等领域多边合作平台建设”，作为支持高质量共建“一带一路”的八项行动的重要内容。一年来，文明交流互鉴经历了从理念到实践、从倡议到行动的深刻演变，而智库则是其中重要的行为主体和推动力量。

进入后疫情时代的世界更趋动荡，多重挑战和危机交织叠加。政治对立愈发凸显，地缘冲突不断加剧，全球经济复苏乏力，发展鸿沟不断拉大，环境、气候变化对人类可持续发展带来愈发严峻的挑战。近日不断升级的巴以冲突已造成大规模人道灾难。造成如今纷繁复杂甚至战火纷飞局面的原因很多，但其中有一条值得我们高度警觉，那就是，不同文明之间、不同种族之间、不同宗教文化之间仍然存在“优劣”“美丑”的傲慢与偏见。人类社会秉承怎样的文明观，将直接关系到人类命运的走向。如果人类社会不改变广泛存在的封闭、保守甚至狭隘的文明观，将无法避免隔阂、冲突与对抗，难以实现持久的和平、和睦与和谐。

智库是思想的创造者、知识的生产者、政策的推动者，是引领时代潮流与前进方向的指南针，应当在应对重大全球性挑战与紧迫性危机中，更加主动肩负起推动文明交流、化解文明冲突、构建人类命运共同体的使命责任。因此，今天我们举行“中国全球智库创新年会”，共同探讨新形势下全球智库合作的时代使命意义重大，在此，我再次向会议的主办方全球化智库和中国人民对外友好协会表达由衷的敬意。借此机会，就这一主题，与大家分享几点思考。

首先，开展多元文化研究，弘扬世界文明多样性。世界文明丰富多彩，没有高低贵贱之分，只有姹紫嫣红之别。傲慢与偏见大多源于无知与狭隘。智库作为思想生产者与政策推动者，对其他文明国家的认知越客观、了解越充分，判断才能越准确，思想才能经得起实践考验。这就需要突破既有思维定势与认知偏见，以开放包容的心态开展对异域文化与异域文明的研究，以增进东西、南北之间以及不同种族、不同信仰、不同文化之间的理解、尊重与共情，为呵护世界文明百花园提供基本知识保障。

第二，推进知识交流分享，倡导全人类共同价值。和平、发展、公平、正义、民主、自由是各国人民的共同追求，也是构建人类命运共同体的价值基础。智库要积极发挥价值引领作用，开展不同国家之间的知识分享与经验交流，以开放包容的胸怀理解和

阐释不同文明对价值内涵的认识，反对将自己的价值观和模式强加于人，不搞意识形态对抗。中国外文局所属智库当代中国与世界研究院（ACCWS），也是本次会议的支持单位，已连续多年推进“当代中国与世界知识分享计划”，并提出“知识发展联盟”的构想，愿意为全球智库知识分享搭建平台、贡献力量。

第三，做好政策解读阐释，建设国际舆论共识。不同文明有着不同的语言传统与话语形态，在表达政策话语时往往容易引起误解甚至误判。这里，就需要智库将本国本民族的话语，转换为其他国家其他民族能够听得懂的国际性话语，并予以阐释和解读。在这方面我们做了尝试，我们推出的《中国关键词》系列多语种公共知识产品，就是以融通中外的表达方式，帮助国外智库准确理解新时代中国的重大概念范畴表述。我注意到本次年会采用了主题发言与圆桌对话等多种交流形式，希望有助于消弭话语障碍、增进舆论共识。

最后，打造协同协作网络，拉紧民心相通纽带。智库是人文交流合作的重要主体，在推动各国人民相知相亲中发挥着思想引领与知识生产的关键作用。我非常高兴地看到，本次参会的智库专家来自亚洲、欧洲、美洲，覆盖十余个国家和地区，饱含着对话交流、协同协作的友好与善意。希望全球化智库进一步发挥其在海内外智库与知识精英交往中的作用，将友好合作、交流互鉴的中国声音更好地传播出去，促进各国人民相知相亲。

女士们，先生们，朋友们！

文明交流互鉴，不仅是一个概念、一个倡议，更是润物细无声、日用而不觉的生动实践，是全球智库值得为之努力的宏伟事业。中国外文局成立于1949年，是中国目前规模最大的综合性国际传播机构之一，我们旗下有新闻出版、中外交流、智库研究、文化贸易等多个不同的板块，我们致力于向世界介绍新时代的中国，展现真实、立体、全面的中国，推动人员交流与文明互鉴。当代中国与世界研究院将以此次年会为契机，与各国智库和有识之士进一步加强交流合作，打造“治国理政与全球治理”“知识分享计划”“国际青年中国行”等品牌活动。让我们携起手来，共同推动人类文明繁荣进步，彰显智库使命担当！

最后，预祝本次活动取得圆满成功。

谢谢大家！

II. The Global Order at A Crossroads: Ways Forward

[Click here](#) to watch the video recording of the 1st roundtable session.

RONG Ying

Vice President, China Institutes for International Studies (CIIS)



Thank you very much, Professor Wang. It's really a great honor and privilege to speak as the first speaker. But I feel really overwhelmed by such a big issue; I don't think we're going to solve it in three minutes. Fortunately, I think the last weekend, actually, we, together with colleagues from the United States and others, discussed a little bit. So, let me very briefly make three points. One point, one minute.

First point is that it is indeed, as Professor Wang said in his opening remarks, that the current international order, whatever you call it—rule-based liberal international order—is not sufficient or effective enough to address or provide answers to the challenges or problems that we are having. Now, what would be the way out, as I think is the theme of this session? I think there are several possibilities: one is something like we call bifurcation, represented by

the United States, China, or others. I think this is not a good alternative, and we may all agree. The second is, of course, related to the fragmentation of international politics. The last one, which I feel we may agree on, is let's work hard to strive for a new international order that is more just, democratic, and inclusive.

The big question actually is, which leads to my second point: I think this is, we have to be purposeful. That is, what will be the purpose of this international order? I think we all agree the current international order, whatever deficiencies, or problems it has, has helped in some way to maintain peace, stability, and development, but the problem is how. So, I would quote a vision, I think, just provided by President Xi in his remark statement at last week's BRI Forum: that is, let's see if we can work out or strive for an international order that will help to build, to promote a global modernization of peaceful development, mutually beneficial cooperation, and prosperity for all. Now, that is to say, what will be China's vision or China's plan for that? And I would again conclude my remarks in thirty seconds by highlighting a formula I believe that can be simplified, that is "1+2+3".

"1" is a concept, that is a community with a shared future. "2" is two platforms for China to strive for: a Chinese approach to modernization and also, I think, the BRI, now we call it high-quality cooperation for BRI. "3" is, of course, the three "G" which you have to take in a holistic way: global development, global security, and global civilization initiative. And I think China is open, China is ready, and China certainly will work very much together with the entire community to implement and put this vision into action. Thank you.

Colin Bradford

Non-resident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development Program, The Brookings Institution; Co-Lead, China-West Dialogue



Henry, thank you very much. It's a real privilege to be here at this first in-person large think tank gathering in China. I hope we can do the same in the United States. As has already been said, the China-West Dialogue, which I founded four years ago with ten other people from Europe, Canada, the United States, China, and Chile, has had now thirty Zoom sessions over the last four years, involving sixty people from seventeen countries. And the essential message of it is pluralism. Pluralism is the dominant geopolitical dynamic in the world, we think. Pluralizing the toxic US-China relationship by the participation of Europe, the global south, and middle powers around the world is the way to embrace the complexity of relationships and approaches to issues, which can then lead to the professionalization of the dialogue rather than polemicization of it, which the binary bipolar US relationship tends to do. So, it's a way of inserting, in between these two powers that are having some difficulties relating to each other, countries with other interests, other perspectives, and that's precisely the diversity of perspectives, which has the power of this idea to pluralize, diffuse, and professionalize the relationship. So, I'd like to ask the staff, if they would, to put up four

examples and rotate them through as I'm talking, of where pluralization, pluralism, and non-alignment have fit into the world. Stunningly, I've come upon a report that's just been released in Japan, which will be one of the things that will appear on the screen, written by, or led by, Yoshihide Sogoyama, and Mike Mochizuki, who I have known and worked with in the nineteen eighties when he himself was at Brookings. I'm gonna read you the first paragraph of this because I think it reflects precisely, Henry, the crossroads theme that you... and the way forward. And it stunningly comes from Japan, who normally you would think would be in lockstep with the United States, but the whole idea of pluralism is one, as an American, that I think is actually in the US interests. So, here's how they start. This is the opening two pages by Mr. Sogoyama and Mike Mochizuki: "In 2018, we convened the Asia's Future Research Group because of concern about the intensification of US-China geopolitical rivalry and the increasing risk of military clash in the Asia-Pacific region. The lack of balance in Japanese public discourse about how Japan should address this evolving strategic environment in Asia deeply troubled us. We saw that not only Asia's future but also Japan's future was at a strategic crossroads. We therefore invited scholars and experts on Japanese foreign policy and international relations to join a multiyear project in order to develop a realistic and moderate Japanese strategy for Asia. The shortcomings of the national security strategy adopted by the Kishida cabinet in December of 2022 confirmed the urgency of this task and the need to chart an alternative course for Japan." So, this is differentiation in the strategic policy of Japan, which normally you would think would be in lockstep with the US. And I would argue that's in the interest not only of Japan but of the United States and of China because it helps to pluralize and diffuse the tensions that are driving, and worst of all, dominating the public discourse in global arenas such that global governance stalls out.

So, Henry, you've talked about this; businesses worry about reputational capital. Reputational capital, you probably would understand, is that if a firm produces a product that actually does the opposite of what it's supposed to do, somehow, their brand name suffers. I think one of the conclusions we've come to in the China-West Dialogue over these four years is that the reputational capital of the US and China is suffering because of the tension, drama, the relationship, and the narratives around it. So, I think there needs to be a shift in that. And one way to think about it and try to induce changes within both Beijing and Washington is to realize that the reputational capital of both countries would be enhanced the more we are able to demonstrate to the world that we are working together for the good of not only our own relationship but the world as a whole and not just going at each other because of value

differences or ideological differences, or what I think are false formulations of binary choices between state and market, between democracy and autocracy, which are basically destructive ways of framing the issues. The issues are much more complex. So that's the basic point.

Fabian Zuleeg

Chief Executive and Chief Economist, European Policy Centre (EPC)



Thank you very much, and I'm very happy to be here for the eighth China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum and also tomorrow's EU-China Think Tank Exchanges. I want to give a special thanks to CCG, and in particular, Henry, for the invitation but also for the cooperation, which has been extremely productive. We've already heard from Henry about how we live in more challenging times, so I think it's even more important to have frank and open exchanges and to foster mutual understanding. I hope I will be able to contribute a bit to the understanding of what is happening in Europe, what Europe's priorities are in this challenging environment. Of course, I do not represent Europe, but I believe what I'm saying is the consensus view not only in the EU institutions and Brussels but also in our member states.

For Europe, the world changed with Russia's invasion of Ukraine because it's questioning the basic tenet of European integration that economic interdependence guarantees peace. So

Europe is questioning this economic interdependence paradigm, and whether it has to be tempered by the geopolitical realities which we are facing. Europe wants to avoid geopolitical fragmentation; it wants to continue to foster open trade, promote multilateralism, and international law, all of which principles China shares. So, we are very much seeing there's a common scope to work together.

But for Europe, supporting international law must also mean supporting Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity. Europe is doing that in conjunction with the US, not coerced by the US. At the same time, the EU is developing new mechanisms and new instruments to deal with major transitions: demography, technology, and sustainability, all of which are clearly also on the agenda not only of China but on the global agenda. These instruments will inevitably have an impact on the EU's relations with the rest of the world, but not only with China, also with the US, and the rest of the world. What I would emphasize is that these mechanisms being developed should not be understood as protectionism aimed at certain countries. They are mechanisms to try to deal with common global challenges, and I would argue that in those areas there is a lot of scope for cooperation and common working. We definitely need that cooperation, the global understanding, the dialogue, so I'm very happy to be here to contribute to that. Thank you again for inviting me.

Khalid Al-Khater

Director of Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar



Colleagues, friends, esteemed participants, let me start first by thanking the organizing body, CCG, and its founder and president, Professor Wang, for inviting me to participate. I look forward to a fruitful discussion ahead.

This conference represents a very important platform for voices not only from this region but for leaders of thought from around the world to interact, better understand, and develop ideas that help us address challenges. The global order stands at a critical juncture. We meet today in difficult times unfolding in our region. Recent events underscore the urgency of reevaluating the international system. With this devastating humanitarian toll and displacement of the population, the current crisis in Gaza cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a stark reminder of the double standards and the lack of justice in the international system. In particular, the crisis has far-reaching implications for global governance at the forefront, which is the fragility of our regional politics. The decentralization of world politics is not a specter on the horizon, but a present shift. Today, across the globe, there are more centers of influence, each with political, economic, military, and technological strengths. Additionally, international stakeholders are contending with the rise of a more active role for regional

actors, adapting the fundamentals of multilateral and bilateral international relations. These actors can more effectively contribute to de-escalation and regional stability. In Qatar, we have always been global advocates for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes. Our foreign policy is balanced by mutually beneficial relations with countries alike. These relations help us host and mediate when our partners need our aid, and we will continue to carry out this role for the common good. In our role as a convenient power facilitating peaceful dialogue, we see the flux in the global order and recognize the importance of continuing to work for an inclusive, more balanced, resilient world through proactive international engagement and continuous investment in global partnerships. We strive to bridge divides and contribute constructively towards peace, security, and prosperity.

The current crisis in Palestine and Israel, and the devastating loss of life among civilians, accentuates the dire and urgent need for such a peaceful resolution. Although this might seem a very local conflict, its potential to spiral regionally and beyond can happen at any moment in time.

Thought leaders and think tanks serve a crucial and ever-growing role to inform and influence global policymakers in different areas. I believe that think tanks in this region of the world must closely cooperate with their counterparts in the Middle East to better aid policymakers and advance the existing flourishing relationships, not only bilaterally but multilaterally as well.

In conclusion, the path ahead is as complex as ever, demanding concerted efforts. Such efforts, however, offer the best hope for a renewed, open, and more importantly, a balanced rule-based international order that does not advocate the interest of one grouping at the cost of international stability and norms. Indeed, we should subscribe to a vision of a shared and responsible future, an approach that Qatar has called for repeatedly. Our upcoming Doha forum, which you mentioned, indeed has the theme this year of shared responsibility. Through our shared responsibility, we can build towards the prosperity and stability of all. Thank you.

Erik Solheim

CCG International Council Member; Vice Chairman, Europe-Asia Center; former Under-Secretary-General of United Nations



Thank you so much, Henry, for bringing us together, and I'll go straight into the matter. I believe that the twenty-first century should be based on two verbs. One is "respect." We need to respect each other across civilizations; and the second is "dialogue." Whenever there is a problem, we need to have a very detailed, strong dialogue.

Look at the one and only strong ideology in the twenty-first century: nationalism. No one all over the world really believes in any other ideology at the moment. In India, Prime Minister Modi is seeking the roots of Indian Hinduism. In Turkey, President Erdogan is seeking the roots of Turkey in Islam. In China, it's becoming more Confucian as far as I can see. European and Americans tend to be a little bit more inward-looking in the last decades. So everywhere, nationalism, the strongest of all ideologies, is already deciding the decisions of political leaders.

But that happens at a time when the world is moving into multilateralism. We will never ever be in the nineteenth century, which was European, nor in the twenties, which was American. Now we have Europe, we have India, we have Turkey, Brazil, we have Indonesia. Indonesia

will become the fourth biggest economies, as I've heard, by 2050, and of course, among all these powers, the two most important are the United States of America and China. So how can we manage this? We need a balance between globalization and nationalism; otherwise, we will fail. The biggest burden falls on the United States of America.

The United States needs to understand that the world is changing very fast. The time is gone where the United States can dominate the world. When you follow foreign policy debates in the United States, there's not a single square meter of land that isn't a major American security interest. How can there be any peaceful land in the Pacific where every bit may be "oh, it's so important for America." If other powers took that view, it would be a recipe for disaster. The United States needs to accept that China is now an equal power and that the United States needs to maneuver in a multipolar world.

When it comes to China, I believe that China can also be a little bit more pragmatic, particularly understanding that China is not so big, so powerful, so all-important to the world. When it comes to conflicts and quarrels with smaller nations, say the Philippines or Vietnam, and even India, maybe China could be a little bit more pragmatic, a little bit humbler, and a little bit more accepting of the views of the other party. But again, the biggest responsibility lies with the United States, but China can also do more for the multipolar world in the age of nationalism to work.

The second issue is business. There are very few people from business here, but it's the center of a lot of what we need to do. In business, we need a balance between competition and cooperation. Cooperation, we all understand, is essential. But competition is also good. For instance, when all the European and American automakers this year have realized how far ahead China is, and how Chinese automakers are far ahead of the European and American companies, it's very good for competition. European and American car makers understand that they need to get up early in the morning and work hard to compete with China. So, we should have a balance between competition and cooperation. We need more European and American investments in China, more Chinese investments in Europe and America, and, of course, in all other parts of the world. Europe, and particularly America, need to get out of the zero-sum idea that whenever there's a benefit for one, there's a disadvantage for the other. On most issues, there are mutual benefits. China is rising; okay, it's a better economy for basically everyone. But China can also do more to ensure that European and American companies are treated fairly in the Chinese market. A European or American company that is successful in China is one of the best bridges across the divide because that company will be

a strong voice for a good business relationship. So, China should do more to ensure that all European and American companies feel fairly treated and have access to the Chinese market, where, of course, the West needs to do exactly the same with companies from China.

Finally, the environment is an obvious area for cooperation. No one disputes the need to cooperate on the environment. It's a kind of soft issue where we can easily cooperate. So, let's use the environment, and that's where the Belt and Road's "Green Coalition" represents, and Europe-Asia can also come into play. How can we use the environment as a standalone issue essential to everyone but also as an area that is a soft bridge for cooperation across the divide between China and the West?

Finally, again, I believe if we base the twenty-first century on these two concepts: "respect" and "dialogue," we will do very well in the decades to come.

CHEN Wenling

Chief Economist, China Center for International Economic Exchange (CCIEE)



Looking ahead into the future and addressing the intertwined challenges of our world, we must propose thoughtful and insightful suggestions. I'd like to focus on four major global

issues that are influencing the world order. It is vital for think tanks to reach a consensus and serve as anchors for a more fair and reasonable global order.

We are at a critical moment, deciding whether the world will choose peace or war. There is a potential onset of a new arms race. For instance, the U.S. defense budget has recently increased from over 800 billion to an additional 100 billion, Russia's defense budget is set to rise by 70% in 2024, Ukraine's military budget will account for 50% of all budget expenditures in 2024, and many countries, including Poland, Turkey, and Italy, are boosting their military spending. Such an escalation in defense expenditure is a driving force pushing us towards war, resulting in devastating consequences for numerous nations, wrecking their economies. The United Nations Charter begins by expressing the determination to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." Hence, think tanks must reach a consensus to promote peace.

The world is currently facing a developmental bottleneck. Should we maintain global development collectively or further fragment economic globalization by building barriers? This is a crucial topic where think tanks must form a consensus. António Guterres highlighted at the 18th Belt and Road International Summit in China that the Belt and Road Initiative brings hope and progress to billions worldwide. President Xi Jinping proposed eight action initiatives during the conference, the first of which was to build a multi-dimensional network of connectivity. The world needs more interconnectedness, not barriers. With China partnering with over 140 countries, efforts to promote policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds aim to prevent global fragmentation.

The ecological crisis is pressing. Do we continue to sacrifice the sustainable development rights of future generations for the immediate welfare of the current generation, or do we self-reflect and prioritize ecological preservation? The Chinese government has taken a distinct path in green development. Not only has China made dual carbon commitments, but 25% of the world's newly green areas, as observed by NASA, originate from China. China is home to 13 of the world's major wetland parks and prioritizes low-carbon, green, sustainable development, setting it as a binding target in its five-year plan. As a result, renewable energy now accounts for nearly 30% of China's total energy, and this figure is expected to rise.

Global order and governance issues need addressing. Will we prioritize the interests of one country over others, or will we uphold global order and rules to foster collective development? We observe that 16% of the global population resides in developed nations, whereas 84% are

in developing countries. There is an evident wealth gap with rich countries getting richer and poor countries getting poorer. According to Forbes' top 2000 companies, U.S. companies dominate multiple sectors, reflecting their competitiveness but also indicating wealth concentration. Hence, we must contemplate the kind of world order we aspire to – one that benefits the majority or continues to favor the wealthy.

Reaching a consensus on these issues and forming public opinion is crucial for the global crossroads we find ourselves at. Thank you all.

Mohamed Amersi

Founder and Chairman, Amersi Foundation



Henry, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to such a gathering. It is a pleasure to be here in Beijing.

Once again, it has been said that there are decades when nothing happens, and then there are months when decades happen. We are at an inflection point where the world order in which I was born is going through a tectonic shift, one in which we are likely to see a world in chaos and disorder before a new order is born. Questions facing global leadership include whether

this transition will embrace a global conflict, following which there will be a reset, or will it be approached via gradualism, a phenomenon which Western powers have employed to instill free market, liberal democracy in the developing world, but have largely failed because of their uneven application and refusal to accept its outcomes. Nonetheless, I would hope for gradualism than a Big Bang. This will give time for competing powers and their visions of a new world order to fully understand each other and to conclude that there is more that unites us than divides us, with respect to the existential threats that we are facing, including nuclear non-proliferation, climate mitigation, and resource scarcity.

But the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown that we could well see a global conflict before a reset. Some would argue that such a conflict is inevitable, but can it be contained so that it does not become existential? Although not ideal, a favorable outcome would be one where conflicts are localized and somewhat asymmetric in nature.

But what sort of global order do we really want to see emerging out of all this? The knee-jerk response is that it could be bipolar, with the rise of China competing with the US: a new Cold War. But nobody knows. I hope, maybe in vain, that it will be a multipolar world, where military might, economic might, technological might, by which I mean AI and cryptocurrency, and environmental mitigation could be led by different powers in a collaborative manner.

An extension of this blue-sky scenario could also see the emergence of what I believe is the future, which is global netizens, global citizens of the net, transcending all borders and barriers. Whether we transition abruptly or gradually, it is clear to me that many institutions and instruments devised after World War Two are largely not fit for purpose, e.g., the UN Security Council. The World Bank and the IMF are largely seen to be supporting democracies of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich, and the alternatives are at too early a stage in their development to know how sustainable they are. Canceling existing institutions is an option, as no one will voluntarily give up power, and therefore only marginalization into irrelevance seems to be the prevailing way forward. Based on present trends, it seems to me that a shift in the balance of global power could impose a new order that is not driven by ideology or geopolitics or bloc politics, but one where the focus will be much less on military, security, and sanction-centric concerns and more on economic and development-centric ones. And, of course, it needs to be de-dollarized.

I come from the world of business, and a key metric employed to measure success is return on investment. The West has invested \$4 trillion in fighting the War on Terror, of which \$3

trillion was invested by the US alone, whereas China invested only \$1 trillion in the Belt and Road initiative. And it's not rocket science to conclude that if success is measured solely by friendship, collaboration, and economic advancement, then China has the edge. Any recognition of this conclusion, though, will require a recalibration of the prevailing, diametrically opposite views of world order and the system under which society is organized and governed. At the very least, better alignment and collaboration, through dialogue on security, technology, the environment, prosperity, and empowerment, will be imperative.

To get there, we might initially see power shifting from the global institutions that I was brought up under, to fragmented, but nonetheless more solidified and effective arrangements with an expansionist mindset, such as the G7, NATO, and EU on the one side, and the Shanghai Cooperation, BRICS, ASEAN, and Belt and Road, etc., on the other. Later on, the African Union, the GCC, and the Commonwealth, and we can see the complexity with which we have to grapple. Relationships are now more transactional than ever before. They will be offering competing visions of a new world order, but only a major reset will dictate which prevails. For now, it looks like the chips might just favor the globalizing South, as opposed to the nationalistic North. As for my own country, the United Kingdom, unfortunately, for now, but hopefully not for too long, we are busy scoring own goals, as we are unable to reconcile the past which we cannot forget, with a future which we cannot control. Thank you very much.

Bruno Liebhaberg

Director General, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)



Thank you very much, Henry, for the invitation to this very useful and very impressive gathering. You ask me how I look at things from Brussels; I'd say the global context is bad. It is bad regionally. We've mentioned wars in Europe. We have wars at the doors of Europe, in Ukraine. We see the rise of the extremes, of the political extremes in many countries in Europe. We have war in the Middle East, Israel against Hamas, unfortunately, probably as well now. We have tensions all over Africa: Libya, Niger, Ivory Coast, East Congo. And in the US, we have a volatile pre-electoral climate, with fear for the US and for the world, that the outcome of the next presidential election is not necessarily going to support multilateralism and make it move forward.

Globally, we see rising terrorism everywhere. In my own town in Brussels, we had a terror attack just a few days ago. Same in France last week and the week before. And then perhaps a word on climate change because I think it has a very important implication. The fact that the likelihood of global warming exceeding the 1.5-degree goal of the Paris Agreement is high and continues to rise. And the escalating risk of climate change, especially in the most vulnerable countries, is bound to have irreversible impacts on people, on species, on

ecosystems, and as such, on our economies and our global governance. And I would not be surprised if not only in the South but also more broadly, in many countries all over the world, public governance becomes, in the years to come, more challenging and more fragile because of climate. We have, however, one piece of good news, and that is the scientific progress, which is moving faster and better than expected.

My second point is on the implications. The ideological polarization is increasing, and this restricts harmonious development, especially as regulatory priorities are politicized. We see polarization, ideological polarization on many fronts: north, south, east, west, developed, least developed countries, democracies, autocratic regimes, secular countries versus theocracies. And I think that if we look at the global issues, I want to get back to what our colleague Solheim said. I think climate is a good example of a global issue which is not polarized. And it's fair to say that the polarization of climate change has been decreasing significantly in the last years between China, Europe, and the United States. And I think it's fair to recognize that China has played a major part in that. China has implemented, since 2021, a national emission trading system, which is the world's largest in terms of carbon emissions and accounts for 40% of China's carbon emission. But the fight is not over. China is still responsible for 30% of the world's emissions. So, we appreciate all the work, which is being done here, and we are confident that these efforts will continue.

The situation is very different with digital. Digital is also a global issue. We have to face the benefits and the challenges of the digital ecosystems. And it's clear that we see now the challenges when members, when governments, try to take back control of the cyberspace. And since regulation is driven by a mix of economic interests and values, and values being the collective choices made by countries and regions, it's not surprising, against the background of polarization, ideological polarization, that I mentioned, that convergence is not necessarily the way those regulations are moving. And if we add the dramatic growth in geopolitical frictions and the lessons drawn from the pandemic, we see that this has led to this new concept, which is not existing only in the EU. Economic security is an issue for everybody: for Europe, for China, for the United States. And I think that the difficulty is when you try to regulate, you see that economic security is defense, security, and economy. And it's very complicated to get those things together. Just to move to the end of my remarks, we have a new landscape, ideologically polarized for digital regulation, governance, and globalization process. We have strong centrifugal forces, which are pushing the global digital economy towards deep convergence and, at the same time, towards segmentation into

different subparts, as illustrated by the US-China technological decoupling, by Internet shutdowns in a number of countries, and other similar practices. And I think that the outcome of the tension between convergence and segmentation of the digital economy will have a very decisive influence on the future of the global economy.

So, what could be a constructive way ahead for global governance? In my think tank, the Center for Regulation in Europe, on regulation in Europe, we've been working on that, and we see that the starting point is the fact that we have a fragmentation of the Internet. And this is good for nobody. It's not good for China. It's not good for the US. It's not good for the EU. And so, with Pascal Lamy, with whom I'm co-leading this project, we have started a project called the Global Governance for the Digital Systems. And what we've seen is that globalization with firewalls is not the way ahead for the regulation of the global Internet. So, our goal is that we can keep, among others, through Track II diplomacy, a convergence and coexistence space for the global governance of the digital world. We realize that that space is very narrow, not least because the number of people authorized to speak out is shrinking, and that those who can speak do not necessarily dare to do so. So, to conclude, I would like to pose very candid questions to my distinguished Chinese friends: What do you think about the establishment of these cooperation corridors? In which part of the digital ecosystem can they be consolidated? How broad are they? And finally, in your view, what does the concept of cooperation still mean today in the world's complex situation? I'll be very happy to hear your views on this. Thank you.

Michael Pillsbury

Senior Fellow, The Heritage Foundation



One of the worst crises in US-China relations happened when Joe Nye and I were in the Pentagon, 1995, 1996. China fired missiles over or near Taiwan. Very much upset our Secretary of Defense. And slowly, this crisis was healed or completed. And it resulted in the President Clinton going to visit China. And some cooperative agreements began.

So 有一个教训 the lesson I draw from that is even when we get into a US-China crisis, there's still optimistically, there's usually a way out. Sometimes it's the role of think tanks. I have been a fan and admirer of Henry [Huiyao Wang] and Mabel [Lu Miao] coming to America so often that they know the exact differences, the debate, between the different American, let's say, top ten think tanks.

One time I saw the schedule of Henry and Mabel visiting the US, I think it was 14 think tanks in 2 days, and you and your wife you knew exactly the differences between Hudson Institute, and Heritage, and Brookings, Carnegie. It's very impressive. I don't think we have an American, maybe Joe Nye had somebody at Harvard who can do this. But think tanks have a special role to be optimistic to identify the problems, but then try to think of solutions or at least a channel for dialogue. And Henry was a channel for dialogue with President Trump on

the trade talks. People as economists at CCG, and Professor Chen [Wenling] here and others had specific ideas: China will agree to this in the trade talks, and not that. And this was outside regular channels, but very helpful.

Now I only have one or two points to make today. One is I'm deviating from the role of a think tank person to be optimistic. I'm relatively pessimistic that relations between US and China and our friends on both sides, Chinese friends, American friends - the situation is getting worse 越来越恶化. It's not a time for optimism. Some of the reasons are lack of communication. No Congressional delegation came here for four years until Chuck Schumer and his bipartisan delegation. By their account, there's a lot of argument going on. The meeting with Xi Jinping was not an optimistic meeting.

There were up to 50 channels in US-China relations between government departments until President Trump cut them all off - cut them all off, his first year. So, you would think President Biden would restore all the channels. How many people think Biden restored all the channels that Trump cut off? Put your hand up? Biden at first restored no channels, and now it's roughly five. And there are very thin discussions between 部长, between cabinet ministers.

Secondly, the One China principle, or the One China policy, used to be the foundation - China called it 政治基础 (political foundation) of the US-China relations. Now, recently, the PLA [People's Liberation Army], I think correctly - Joe [Nye], correctly - PLA said, "America is distorting and stretching beyond belief the one China principle". Right now, this week, House and Senate are discussing a proposal, with strong bipartisan support, to put American weapons and ammunition in Taiwan, to station them there permanently, then to set up a strategy group between the American Pentagon and Taiwan's military to do joint military planning, then to continue the American special forces troops already placed in Taiwan two years ago. This should not be happening. The One China policy or principle should not be violated. The Heritage Foundation recently published a study about a new Cold War with China. We explicitly said we support continuing the One China Policy, but our fellow conservative think tank Hudson Institute Henry used to visit - now it's been sanctioned - Hudson Institute's position, they sent 我们以前的国务卿 (our former Secretary of State) Pompeo, he flew to Taipei 两次 two times, proposed diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. This never happened in the last 50 years. So, I can give you a long list. There's actually quite a long list. Both sides have 红线 red lines. Each side has been crossing these red lines in the

last few years. So, I hope I'm wrong. I hope all think tanks who came today will be optimistic and come up with some solutions. But just to make a list, Henry, of the conflicts, 我们必须避免的冲突 (the conflicts we have to avoid) we need a good list of what are the conflicts that think tanks could be innovative about. 我讲完了，谢谢，各位。(I'm done talking, thank you.)

SHI Yinhong

Chairman of Academic Committee, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China



Among the three metric great powers—the US, Russia, and China—two are deeply involved in their respective wars or even wars. China remains in peace, but peace is increasingly hard. So, for a minimum peaceful international order, a precondition is obviously the prevention of major conflict between China and the United States, with its core ally Japan. I would like to spend my 3 mins on this subject.

Between China and the United States, with Japan, emotional power politics dominates. There is clearly a reversed or ominous confidence in each other, through about decades of

increasing tension and rivalry. China on one hand, and the United States and Japan on the other, generally have established confidences in each other's aggressive intentions and actions, with the fundamental order of the region, or even of the world, at stake. And this has become drastically, much more established, in the most recent years, mostly through interactions. Those about Taiwan, about the East China Sea, as well as the Sea of Japan, about the South China Sea, about the Korean Peninsula, about the arms race, about the China-Russia power alliance. So, the space for confidence building, in the conventional sense, has been much narrowed. With that, for preventing mutual conflict, is largely the only one that could be captivated.

In a highly regrettable circumstance, at present, high-level minister-to-minister communication, formerly suspended between China and the United States, and diplomacy fell largely into confrontation or general record or secondary and smaller problems. Tasks that should be defined include, I believe, 1st, to raise further the priority of avoiding military conflict in international policy agendas. 2nd, restoring high-level minister-to-minister communication as soon as possible, and for which the United States must abandon its guard railing definition and make it more frequent, more regularized, and at a higher level. Third, working out commonly acceptable principles and rules on military actions over major hot spots. Fourth, the problematic approach taken in diplomatic communications should decouple, as fully as possible, international security concerns from domestic spillovers. And finally, to change the ways of so-called information warfare, or propaganda, making it based on facts of each other's factual military actions, rather than perceived intentions, especially those that are generalized. Thank you for your attention.

James Laurenceson

Director, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology Sydney



Thanks, Henry, and to CCG for the invitation. Let me share with you a couple of thoughts on Australian attitudes towards the state and future of the regional order. Perhaps it's somewhat representative of some other regional middle powers.

Australia has a reputation, rightly, as a staunch US security ally beyond the bilateral ANZUS Treaty. We are enthusiastic participants in arrangements such as the Quad and now AUKUS. This can sometimes lead to pronouncements that Australia is just a US lapdog that lacks an independent foreign policy. But it's a bit more complicated than that. It's certainly true that Australian foreign policy is generally sympathetic to US positions, but that's mostly because Canberra assesses that these US positions align with Australia's own assessments of its national interest. Australia also has positions that are distinct.

Here are three data points that I think are perhaps not fully appreciated in both Beijing and Washington as well. The first, in April, Australia's foreign minister plainly stated that the era of US unipolarity in the region is over. We now exist, she said, in a region that is multipolar. Australia certainly supports an ongoing US prominent role in the region. But Canberra's goal is not to preserve US primacy, but rather to ensure there's a strategic balance in which no

single country dominates. In other words, Canberra accepts that the US role in the region must change. I'll leave to my American colleagues to inform us whether Washington also accepts this. The second data point. Last November, Australia's trade minister described US export controls targeting China, devised by the Biden administration, as "draconian." A few years ago, the previous Australian government also made clear that it did not support the unilateral tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on China. Now that's not just because Australia's own trade with China continues to set new record highs every month. It's because for Australia, talk of an international rules-based order overseen by the World Trade Organization isn't just a propaganda talking point. It delivers results. When Beijing disrupted a variety of Australian exports in 2020, it wasn't Washington or Canberra, or other geopolitical friends that protected Australia's economy. In fact, trade data clearly shows that the companies snapping up most lost Australian sales to China were, in fact, American ones. What did protect the Australian economy was access to open and competitive global markets underpinned by the multilateral trading system. When Chinese importers stopped buying Australian coal, copper, cotton, and more, those markets quickly redirected Australian exports elsewhere, at low cost. Australia and China's engagements with the WTO Disputes Settlements process have provided an independent, neutral forum that, in August, led to the removal of tariffs that Beijing had placed on Australian barley. And just this week, we learned a similar process is now unfolding for Chinese tariffs on Australian wine. A final data point. Australia's Foreign Minister says that our national interest lies in being at every table where regional economic integration is being discussed, and that includes with China. She says, this is important. This is important. Canberra sees deeper regional economic integration as delivering not only greater economic prosperity but also greater stability and security. Again, I'll leave it to my American colleagues to brief us on whether this view is also shared in Washington. Thank you.

WANG Yong

Professor and Director of Center for American Studies, Peking University



The world is at a crossroads. It is a very important discussion today. I would like to use three words to describe the challenges and tasks that we are now facing. One is the tremendous challenges we have seen. It is the end of the Cold War order. We have passed the good times, the last 30 years. The world starts to play in a greater power rivalry. And the rising ethnic territorial conflicts everywhere.

So, I think what we are seeing now is domestic state governance and international governance failing to address these challenges. On one hand, we have seen the explosion of wealth growth in the last 30 years, but we have also seen the widening wealth gap in almost all countries, especially in leading countries like the United States, E.G. So, we have seen political polarizations and the rising of nationalism in many other countries. On the other hand, we have seen the failure of international coordination and cooperation. We have observed that international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, haven't been able to prevent or stop the international financial crisis. The World Bank hasn't delivered the growth and development goals to the developing countries. The WTO has failed to conclude the Doha round of negotiations, now under the opposition of many members, hindering its

working and operations. So, we face tremendous challenges. To some extent, we can argue that the world is moving to the threshold of a new World War. We have seen signs reminiscent of World War One and World War Two in the global political, economic, and security situations.

Secondly, tremendous catastrophes might be waiting for us in the near future if we cannot find solutions.

The third word is tremendous opportunities. We need real democracy in domestic state governance to prioritize the people's interests, the goals of development, justice, fairer distribution of wealth, and more effective governance domestically. In international governance, the existing institutions should reform themselves to include more countries on an equal footing and to innovate measures and mechanisms to work together to address these challenging issues. We also need real democracy to be integrated into current and innovative international governance institutions. So, the last word highlights great opportunities for think tanks like us. There are echoes to the voices and opinions from the floor. The representatives of the think tanks here should work together and reach consensus on these crucial issues: challenges, dangers, and opportunities for building consensus on the reform of state and global governance. We, as scholars and experts of think tanks, have the responsibility to show the world direction and hope. Thank you very much.

Doug Bandow

Senior Fellow, Cato Institute



It certainly is a time of rising international discord. There is much to discuss. And to give a short answer to James, the question of whether policymakers in Washington recognize their own limitations was answered by President Biden in his speech this past week. He quoted Madeleine Albright about the US being the "indispensable nation." I do not perceive the limitations you may be looking for. I think that we see an international system that is under extraordinary stress, a part of which has been mentioned earlier: our military and security attentions. What we see, I believe, are very difficult issues around the globe, ones that have the potential for expanding in very dangerous ways. We certainly see in Europe an active combat between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a proxy war supported by the United States and Europe, which has its own potential for expanding in dangerous ways. We see in the Middle East extraordinary bloodshed and instability introduced by the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and the potential for forces like Hezbollah and others coming in; this could also expand in very dangerous ways, with major powers involved, especially the United States. And we see increasing tensions in East Asia, as Michael mentioned, regarding the question of Taiwan, changes in policy there that have moved us to a new normal with greater tensions

and a set of dangers. All of these are occurring simultaneously. We see very important economic issues, international debt problems, especially focused on the Global South.

This is not new. I came to the Reagan administration 40 years ago when many of the debt problems occurring at that time required restructuring and transformation of the World Bank, IMF, and other institutions. So, we need to look for ways to solve the current crisis and hopefully avoid another repeat in the future. We see major governments around the world that have their own domestic debt problems. I might note that my own country is one. As far as I can tell, no one in Washington believes that they should have to pay for the benefits they want to provide the American people. At some point, that approach stops working. And we see other governments around the world with many of the same kinds of problems. We also observe population declines in many important countries, which may have unpredictable consequences for the future in places like Europe, China, and South Korea. In countries with working populations declining, even in the United States and others, we see reductions or plateaus in growth. We also witness significant social and political problems, both internationally and domestically, around the world. We notice sharpened rivalries among great powers as well as middle powers, some of which have their own potential dangers. One might imagine, for example, a nuclear North Korea with ICBMs that can reach around the world, equipped with multiple warheads and nuclear weapons, transforming the potential threat in dramatic ways. There are issues with Iran and other countries as well. We see divisions among people, increasingly along lines of religion and ethnicity. And we also notice the rise of populism as a political force, as mentioned earlier in Europe. We see it in the United States and, I believe, in many ways, in India and other countries. This kind of populism, especially when mixed with nationalism and sentiments of ethnic and religious superiority, presents its own sets of dangers.

The question of how to move forward is challenging to answer in just 3 or 4 minutes. I think the starting point is that the large powers have the greatest obligation to find a way to work together, to move past their differences, cooperate, and contain the impact of the consequences of their disagreements. This is particularly important for the United States and the People's Republic of China. These two great countries must coexist, find a way to work together, and ensure that the 21st century remains peaceful in terms of great power conflict, avoiding war. The role of middle powers, I believe, is taking on increasing importance: how to counter and challenge malignant middle powers, but also to accommodate and respect those that want more involvement. Addressing issues like North Korea is problematic in its

own right. South Korea now boasts an economy in the world's top ten. India has surpassed the PRC with the second-largest population and has a growing economy. In the Middle East, we face problems of ethno-nationalism and religion across the board, from an Islamist Iran to a very different Israel that today has a radical government. In other countries, such as Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa, and on other continents, there's a desire for a greater share of international decision-making. The question of how to incorporate these nations is critical for us all. And then there's the Global South: both aiding its development and holding it accountable for its government's failures. The Global South wants greater respect and influence in the world. This will be a significant issue in the coming years. In this context, NGOs, and particularly think tanks, have a vital role to provide innovative solutions and to look beyond the interests of their governments. Governments should respect the role of think tanks, welcome them into the policy-making process, and be prepared to accept some criticism. Governments can learn effectively if they incorporate feedback from their citizens rather than rejecting it.

We live in challenging times, as has been said, and it's essential to understand that this isn't just about economics or money, but in many ways, potentially, about survival. It's crucial to look beyond assigning blame and to be willing to accept responsibility for many of the problems we face. The blame is widely shared, and we must come together to address these issues. We must prioritize long-term goals over immediate political gains. There's much to do, and I hope additional forums like this can play a role in fostering discussions that outline solutions for the future. Thank you.

Gladden J. Pappin

President, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs



So, I just wanted to say a couple of words, and actually start with a question that I've encountered already in the last day, which is, why is Hungary attending a conference on globalization? Isn't Hungary the marquis European state that's regressing to populist nationalism or something like that? And it's a fair question because that's what is said in the international media frequently. But actually, Hungary is now, and always has been, in favor of a particular type of globalization that also allows it to maintain its identity. And we believe that there are a lot of states, a lot of middle powers, rising middle powers, and regional states, that feel the same way. And so, for that reason, the Hungarian strategy is a strategy of connectivity on the basis of preservation of its national identity, culture, and tradition. And I don't want to be too backward-looking or provide too much commentary on the last 30 years, but I think we could say that at times, there have been elements of the presentation of globalization over the last 30 years that have too much emphasized an expectation that all cultures and countries would abandon their traditional ways and merge into one gigantic, global, consumer-driven culture. And that the expectation was that in that world, it doesn't matter where anything is made, borders are going to go away, traditions will fade away, etc. I

think we can all agree that world is definitely not materializing. So, there are some differences between the Hungarian position and the older principles of liberal globalization. Hungary is against mass migration and is in favor of preserving its traditional family structures and supports a strong family policy. But in fact, we view those as essential to creating and sustaining our ability to make links with a lot of different cultures and a lot of different economic partners. Hungary is the 11th most complex economy in the world, despite its very small size, and given its location in Central Europe, is likely to benefit from a lot of new trade routes and general geopolitical shifts that will make that part of the world continue to be more important.

So, our theory of connectivity is a little bit different from the old one, but we believe that it reflects a new and growing consensus among smaller powers, that the way to navigate the world is in a multivector way, that we can be part of different security arrangements, but also have multiple economic cooperation. Unfortunately, this is not always well received by some of our American friends. There was an American think tank visiting me in Budapest not too long ago, and they said, you know, you guys really need to focus much less on East-West connectivity between Hungary and Asia, and more on North-South connectivity. And I had to stop and ask, well, who do you think is building the Budapest–Belgrade north-south Railway? And I didn't get an answer to that question. So, I think, we're in favor of a peaceful transition to a multipolar world. And I know it seems more and more implausible that it will be something that's peaceful. But it's, we believe that it's, you know, from our own history of having seen the perils of bloc formation and the difficulties that that causes for states that are caught on the periphery of those boundaries, we believe a lot of states are thinking the same way. And so the connectivity project that our institute is launching, will hopefully be a platform that we can continue this discussion on. Thank you very much.

SUN Jisheng

Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU)



Well, the theme of this round table is "The Global order at a crossroads: ways forward." At crossroads is the most important thing. The most important thing is we need to guarantee the direction is right, otherwise, we will not be able to walk into the future, but step back into the past. So, related to crossroads and direction, I would like to focus on three points.

The 1st one is we need to guarantee the direction of the world order. In the past several years, we have heard different comments, judgments, predictions about the world order. We hear fragmentation, division, or disorder, or even the collapse of world order. So, the reason that we have so many problems with the world order, on the one hand, is related to material power, the distribution of power. On the other hand, it is also related to many ideational factors. So, so far, if we want to guarantee the right direction of the world order, I mean all the world, especially the major countries, need to work out a right direction for the world order. We need to guarantee that the world order will be more inclusive, more open, and can accommodate different actors for the world today, not only major countries but also new, emerging countries, and the developing world.

Besides, we also need to guarantee that we get rid of, or we think less about geopolitics, geopolitical competition, less of a zero-sum game, more of a one-community sense. Because if we cannot do that, simply, we cannot guarantee the right direction of the 2nd point, that's global governance. We have come across different kinds of global challenges. Because in the past years, probably, we talked about traditional global governance problems. But from this year, we turn back to talk about traditional security problems, such as the Ukraine crisis or what is going on in the Middle East.

We live in a global village, but also, we live in a digital era. Things can produce a spillover effect very easily. If any of these global issues cannot be handled properly, then the whole world probably will be in a disaster, so that will not only influence security but also probably the survival of all human beings.

And then the 3rd direction I would like to focus on is what is the right direction for think tanks. Because usually, for think tanks, the most important thing for us to do is to figure out problems and figure out the solutions. But I think at this crossroads, we not only need to recommend policy choices, but also, we need to do more to build consensus. Consensus building. Because we not only influence the government, policymakers but also will influence the general public. So, we need to educate the public to help to construct a kind of cooperative, friendly, and more one-community sense language. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult for the world to cooperate and collaborate at the crossroads. That's all. Thank you.

Joseph Nye

University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government



Thank you very much, Henry. And my congratulations to you on gathering such a distinguished group of think tanks because while we have common problems in the world, having ways to understand how each other analyzes problems is crucial. And so, my congratulations to your contribution to this.

Our topic is global order, world order. Norms matter, but norms in their extent which they affect global order depend on the underlying structure of power. After the World War II, we created the United Nations, but the distribution of power in the world was bipolar between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And that distribution of power basically paralyzed the UN in many of its functions. So, we have to have a clear understanding of the distribution of power if we're going to have an understanding of our capacity to do anything about the common problems that we face. We'd all like to wish for a better world, but without an understanding of the power that underlies it, our wishes cannot be fulfilled.

Now, it's very common to talk about the world becoming multipolar. I think we confuse ourselves when we use that terminology. If one looks at the world today in terms of the

distribution of power, we really should use the analogy of a three-dimensional chess game. At the top level, let's say, of military power, there's only one country which has global military power projection capabilities -and that's the U.S.

In the middle level, the middle board of economic power, the world is multipolar and has been for two decades: U.S., China, Europe, Japan, basically, these are roughly equal powers. But if you go to the third board, the bottom board of transnational relations of things that cross borders, outside the control of governments, it makes no sense at all to talk about multipolarity or bipolarity or unipolarity. This is a totally different world, and yet this is where many of our problems come from.

So how do you think about the world today? Some people say, well, the world is entering a new Cold War between the U.S. and China. You have the era of great power competition replacing the era of engagement. But I think that metaphor of the Cold War also misleads us. If you look back at the real Cold War, you'll notice that there was [inaudible] military interdependence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but almost no economic interdependence and very little social interaction. Whereas if you look at the relationship between the United States and China today, there's enormous economic interdependence, half \$1 trillion worth of trade. And there's also social interdependence - at one point before COVID, there was something like 300,000 Chinese students studying in American universities.

But something else is interesting about the world today, which is the rise of what I call ecological interdependence, issues like pandemics and climate change, which were not major problems during the real Cold War. And therefore, we need a strategy which is much more subtle than a Cold War strategy of containment if we're going to deal with the problems we face.

Take, for example, the transnational problem of COVID, which we've all just experienced. I would argue that different countries did differently in terms of their capacity. But I think the United States and China were both failures. Each of our countries lost over a million people. And if you think about that, that's more people than have been killed in all wars in the United States behavior since 1945. So, it's something which is not been handled well. And it's also something of great importance. And it's something which may come back. I mean, we may not have seen the last major pandemic. In that sense, we have to develop ways of cooperating on this. Take, for example, the fact that on the SARS epidemic, in the early 2000s, the U.S. and China cooperated very well with transnational networks of scientists who were able to

share information and to stop the spread of the virus almost immediately, so the number of deaths was relatively small with thousands. And compress that with the competition between the U.S. and China on COVID, and you'll see why I regard both countries as failures.

In that sense, we have to think about how do we do two things at the same time which seem mutually contradictory, which is compete, which we're going to see in U.S.-China relationships in terms of great power issues, but cooperate at the same time to deal with these transnational threats. It's very hard for countries to encompass two contradictory thoughts at the same time. But we're going to have to learn to do it. We can't wish away the competition, but we can wish away the transnational threats.

How would you describe this situation then? At Aspen Strategy Group this summer, Secretary of State Blinken used the terminology "competitive coexistence", former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has called it "managed competition". The point that we have to learn is to think of both of these terms at the same time and not focus simply on one or the other. In that sense, if we think about competitive coexistence, we have to realize on the transnational issues, this third board of the three-dimensional chess board of power that I mentioned. One has to imagine not just power over other countries, but power with other countries. These issues, the transnational issues, cannot be solved by exerting power over other countries. You have to have power with other countries.

I've given you the example of COVID where essentially the U.S. and China failed to act with each other adequately. But another equally important problem is climate change. If you think about the damage that will be done to Chinese agriculture by the drying up of the Himalayan glaciers and rivers, or you think about the damage that will be done to Miami or New York by a sea level rise of six feet. This is much larger than many wars. And yet scientists tell us that this is plausible, that it could happen. So, the idea that we have to cooperate on climate change strikes me as another example of "power with" rather than "power over". There are other transnational threats that we have to think about. Proliferation, for example, of weapons of mass destruction. We've had some degree of success on nuclear non-proliferation. But we now have a new problem, which is Artificial Intelligence applied to military affairs. And this is, again, going to require some cooperation in an area where President Xi and President Biden should be in discussion, as well as the economic issues that they'll discuss when they meet at APEC in November.

So, my message is that think tanks should be careful, not to be captured by historical metaphors that mislead. I would argue that multi polarity is one. I would argue that cold war

is another. Instead, we have to think of how do we reconcile both competition and cooperation at the same time. Because if we fail to do that, we're going to all suffer, not just the US and China, but the world climate and the world economy. Those are my thoughts about where I think think tanks should focus.

Jeff Nankivell

President and CEO, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada



Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And a big thank you for bringing us all together. We definitely need more of this kind of thing in the world. And I think that's come through quite clearly. Allow me to apologize that the adventures of traveling from Canada have brought me here, just landing this morning, and now I have the burden of being the last speaker and following Professor Nye. I am, however, unburdened by not having heard much of the earlier presentations. So, excuse me if what I say may have some repetition, but I think it actually flows very well from the last couple of presentations.

Speaking as a Canadian and as a citizen of a country that has been active in multilateralism since the first concepts of multilateralism found practical application in the last century, I'd like to focus on the practical issues, the things when we talk about cooperation and

competition in the international order. Every few speeches, it's important to bring ourselves back to what is it that we want to achieve for our people around the world in creating systems, rules, norms, and so on. And I think there are two really pressing issues that are top of mind in almost every corner of the globe. Both relate to the changes we are all experiencing through the rapid development of our climate situation: its food security and the urgency for climate action.

On food security, the practical challenge is how we can organize ourselves in this world to ensure that supply chains for food and for inputs related to food production are as robust as possible, while keeping food affordable for the broad mass of society. This affects people at the household level, all across the globe, and will be a major determinant of the citizens' level of satisfaction with their own governments and leadership. Leaders are very focused on this everywhere. Effective action on this to meet these very practical objectives will require a very high degree of international cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to ensure that trade is as free as possible, that export restrictions are minimized, that standards are harmonized, and that technological innovations in areas, such as alternative proteins and advanced plant breeding techniques, can be shared both quickly and safely. We have seen in the last century the enormous benefits to human welfare from technological innovation in agriculture. But we live in a world now where regulatory cooperation and harmonization are going to be absolutely essential if we are to make progress and ensure that our societies are resilient in the face of climate change and the impact it has on the agri-food sector.

And then, when it comes to climate mitigation, as we all know, it requires a very high degree of international cooperation and discipline to raise standards and to raise levels of commitment and to avoid free riding. This is especially important, I think, as we go into the next couple of decades, in a context where we will have climate disasters that will continue to be more frequent and more dramatic in their impacts, regardless of the positive actions we take on mitigation. And there is a significant challenge for political leaders of the next generation, over the next 20 years. Because even if we achieve a fantastic degree of cooperation and discipline in taking the essential actions to meet targets to reduce the rate of global temperature rise by 2050, in the 2030s and 2040s, life is going to get more difficult for people in households worldwide. Governments and intergovernmental bodies will have to answer to those populations, making it essential for government legitimacy for leaders worldwide to work together on that and to avoid vulnerabilities that could be exploited by populists, sometimes in the interest of finances.

I'd like to mention here there's a mechanism, a non-governmental, essentially non-intergovernmental mechanism, that has offered a practical model of cooperation for over three decades, based right here in Beijing. It's the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development. Conceived in the early 1990s, it began as a partnership led by China and Canada and was really focused on China, but it brought experts from around the world and international organizations to discuss environment and development challenges. This has lasted for over three decades. It's an extraordinary testament, I think, to vision and leadership from agencies and ministries of the government of China to continue inviting experts from around the world for these discussions. This is a model of how to stimulate innovation through applied research with a very practical focus. To meet these objectives will require a new commitment to effective multilateralism. Middle powers look to the leading powers for this. Recent behaviors aren't encouraging in this regard, but we need to form, as broadly as possible, a coalition of the willing to push for a renewed commitment to practical multilateralism to address the shared challenges Professor Nye highlighted.

Finally, I would say for think tanks, it strikes me that we have many forums in the international system for talking but think tanks should be the mechanism for listening. We all have an important job to do in attending gatherings like this and working with each other to bring back to our audiences, whether they're domestic, regional, or global, what we learn and hear. There's a lot of talking in the world, but there's a deficit of listening. I'm so happy to be here to listen, and I look forward to hearing from all of you. Thank you.



III. Reframing US-China Bipolar Dynamics by Pluralizing into China-West Relations

[Click here](#) to watch the video recording of the 1st China-West Roundtable discussion.

ZHU Feng

Academic Council Expert of CCG; Executive Dean of School of International Studies, Nanjing University



I think the time has been running tougher, even tougher than most times since the end of the 2nd World War. The reason is multiple. First of all, we see a global issue is hitting the earth harder. The other is we're seeing power redistribution. Today, yes, no matter how attractive pluralism is, the real power structure remains unipolar. My friend, Professor John Ikenberry, once made a great point. He said he concluded the unipolar moment might be the best distribution of power. In history, the reason is America, by nature, is a benign power. A benign hegemon. But it seems to me now his theory is just going empty.

I think a couple of the domestic reasons are also running very high. For example, what about American domestic politics? I'm dean for the School of International Studies at Nanjing University. I'm also specializing in American studies. Today's American domestic politics really make all American observers very, very strange. And I'm also very curious: what is happening in your country? Since President Lincoln declared the liberation of black slavery, I see the US has never been more divided, falling, tumbling into domestic, some sort of, fragmentation and even frictions.

But the problem is, foreign relations and domestic politics are always indispensable. It's a vertiginous combination. So, it makes a lot of sense to me: as long as the US feels vulnerable domestically, the US consensus is running high. Many American elites, policymakers, and even political figures prefer to play up China's threat as high as possible, making use of the idea that China poses an international threat to the US. Therefore, the China threat becomes a facilitator for American domestic politics, to achieve cohesion and even unity. In that sense, I really feel very disillusioned about China-US relations. Because as long as the political peculiarity of the United States doesn't change, I see there's no room for our relations to improve.

So that's why, when we think about whether pluralism will be booming in the future, to be honest, there is no way at all. I read The New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal every day. I see some sort of very dramatic domestic political tone. The US never changes, and whether China should become some sort of debate is increasing, but the problem is the US now has decided to make use of the China factor. So then, against this backdrop, no matter how we try to pull the relations closer or make some sort of compromising gesture, how can our bilateral relations finally and eventually skip over the domestic barriers in the United States? So as a professor, I have to say, as long as American domestic politics remain highly fragmented and fractured, there's little hope that both governments could truly give a warm embrace.

But the problem we face is the way this, some sort of, we say, terrible reality. Is there any way we can work on this together? Yes, we can work together. Yeah, I see people-to-people relations as always, some sort of a significant cushion to any escalation. If we just have a quick, even brief look at our history, going back to the 30s last century. What was China then? China was something small, a weak girl who deserved a lot of sympathy from Americans. But after Japan invaded China, China also became the most reliable ally to the US. Now, I'm a worker from Nanjing University. Nanjing is a real historical witness to how rich and robust

our historical connection once used to be. So, people-to-people relations should go beyond something political, you know, arguments and political fragmentation, and keep both people sticking together because we need to know more about each other.

Today, China is indeed reemerging, but it remains largely a transitional power. Of course, sooner or later, China will also become a shining democracy; there is no question about that. However, how can American friends maintain their confidence in China's future? So, today, I think after Joe Biden came to power, it has become clear to me that it has very poorly declared the real competition in today's world. It appears to frame the competition as solely between the US, representing democracy, and China and Russia, representing authoritarianism. I find this perspective a very vicious dichotomy and should be tossed aside. Otherwise, we cannot truly have a serious look at each other.

Secondly, I want to suggest that neither side should be smarty-pants. I'm serious. Yeah, Chinese and Americans, we are all very, very proud of our cultural civilization. That's the point I think President Biden made very correctly. He said, now, the competition and confrontation between Beijing and Washington is a competition between the two civilizations. But what civilization definitely means for policymakers and thinkers is that they consider themselves in a morally better position than you to ask you to do this, ask you to do that. If we always just move that way, China and the US, Chinese and Americans will very quickly become smarty-pants. What does smarty-pants mean? I mean, I always consider I'm great and you are wrong. So, we should really, really eliminate some sort of, as I mentioned, such a vicious dichotomy, and create some sort of more space, not just practically, but also spiritually, yeah, to keep both sides accommodating with it.

The last point I want to say is this. Why does the US remain very, very stable, and robust in your unipolar position? Because your network proves to be much more robust than China's. So, China, that's also one point. China also wants to learn from the US. Yes, today, China just believes we did a lot of things. We are the biggest contributor to the world economic growth. We're also the first donor of COVID medicines and rescue aid to third-world countries. But there's no way China should always just feel proud of how good we are. What's most important is how broad and profoundly China's network is spread out. So, from this standpoint, China's future reemergence has no way to skip the US, has no way to take a detour from our relations with Washington. My view on the US is also this: if the US could just feel, yeah, today, even just a unipolar moment, remaining just how, say, unshakeable. But how to pull China into some US-centered new global network? It's also another challenge.

So, conclusively, today's world situation is running tougher and harsher. But the problem is, I think the US and China should still form a pair to stick with each other. Let me stop here.

Michael Pillsbury

Senior Fellow, The Heritage Foundation



I have some ideas for your purpose of a vision statement or having consensus so we can report to governments, officials. You know, we have consensus about this. Please do something. Um, it's really one concept with three parts. There are three negotiations that have started in various ways between the US and China. Think tanks should not ignore these negotiations. You can attend the meeting; it's closed. What can you learn about it?

The first, and I would call them non-negotiations. These are three things that are not happening that any vision statement has to deal with. You can't just ignore it. The first one is the trade talks. The trade talks began when Liu He came to Washington, and there was a text that both sides put down their views, more than 20 demands on each side. The text grew longer and longer, finally 95 pages. There was some renegeing; there were more tariffs. There are several books about this. One is the excellent Wall Street Journal book called Superpower

Showdown, the inside story of the trade talks. Henry Wang Huiyao is actually in the book for the constructive role CCG played.

Now, these talks were resisted by China for two years. The Chinese side had some rough idea that they would have to make concessions in the trade talks. The American side punished China until the talks started. There was a mutual agreement. It was a done deal. The talks were supposed to have phase two. Things that were too hard for phase one, mainly subsidies, where the Chinese side would have to admit how much subsidies they have to various companies, and then whether that's WTO compliance or not. Now, the Biden administration appointed a Chinese American from the House Ways and Means Committee to be their US TR. The Chinese side refuses to negotiate with her. There are no phase-two talks at all. Phase one has largely not been implemented. Some things have been implemented. Trump calls it a success. The Chinese side refers to it sometimes as a success. So, can a vision statement or consensus ignore the Chinese side's refusal to have the trade talks continue? I put that as a question to you, Colin.

Second Negotiations were an idea that the Russians agreed with America. Big surprise, right? China was invited to come to the strategic stability talks, nuclear arms control discussions in Vienna. The US side put out, with the Russians' help, we put out a Russian flag, an American flag, and a Chinese flag, waiting for the Chinese delegation to come. They didn't come. Strategic stability talks have been endorsed by the Biden administration. The idea actually began under Obama when there were some strategic stability talks. This also has to do with activities in outer space. Our side has testified that China has developed a number of offensive capabilities in outer space, one of which is one satellite reaching out to another to grab it. Kind of like a James Bond movie. China can do this now. There's a number of other activities that the Russians and Americans would like to know more about. Why are you doing this? That's the strategic stability talks. China will not come. And they have various reasons. It's Cold War thinking, or our nuclear weapons are a very small number. We're not a great power like you and Russia. But this is different from Xi Jinping's own speeches, where he says China's DNA and culture help China contribute to the global order. So, no trade talks, no strategic stability talks.

And then there's a particularly strange Chinese refusal. And I can give you the reasons China says no military-to-military contact. Now, this has built up since the '70s. I myself was personally involved in the military talks. They were very helpful to both sides. The generals and admirals on each side could try to understand, like you're talking about listening today.

Each side would listen to the other. Out of it came an agreement. It's a kind of like an Incidents at Sea agreement we had with the Soviet Union but different for China. Mutual notification of maneuvers, not going too close to each other's ships, not having navy fighter aircraft suddenly surprise each other. Very constructive. The Chinese side has stopped these talks. They refused to restart them. It's been a Biden request now for two years. The Chinese explanation, well, you put sanctions on our 国防部长, our Defense Minister, Mr. Lee, and we can't, you know, have military contact while you have these sanctions on. Okay, but is that supposed to be 100 years, or how long are we not going to have military exchanges and contacts? It's quite important, Colin, in terms of accidental war. If you saw Joe Nye's upped piece in December last year, he specifically warns of an accident like the assassination that begins World War One. Many people are scared about this. We have no military channel, not before the American side for our domestic politics, as Zhu Feng said, but because the Chinese side refuses to start the talks. We have a rumor that the Foreign Ministry, other parts of the Chinese government want these talks to start again, but PLA is in charge of the talks, and they say no.

Now, I'm only giving you three examples of negotiations that are not going on. There are more examples. So, the visionary statement, if you want consensus, I think, cannot ignore these issues and address microeconomics or, you know, social middle-class needs. That's all important. But I put it to you as a question: isn't there a cost to any kind of consensus that leaves out at least these three negotiation issues that are not happening because of the Chinese side?

Fabian Zuleeg

Chief Executive and Chief Economist, European Policy Centre (EPC)



I wanted to make two points, really, on the subject of multipolarity. And it's interesting that we've so far had a US-China conversation. So maybe I'll bring in a European perspective to make it less bipolar in the direct. So, I wanted to make one comment really, on how does the polarity in the world look from a different perspective, from countries which are not within those two. What is often seen as the bipolar power structure. And sometimes it's hard to avoid the conclusion that it's bipolarity when you see how certain countries act. If countries force other countries to make a choice, to decide to be on one side or the other, then it becomes a very bipolar world. And I think is important that there's a recognition that those countries which have great power also have to exercise restraint and responsibility. I think the second point really, I wanted to ask is, is multipolarity analytical, or is it aspirational, or maybe a bit of both? And if it is aspirational, how do we turn this into a concept which can practically engender corporation? How do we overcome the barriers which are there for corporation at the moment? And there, I think what really, for me, needs to be the focus here is the question of trade-offs, the question of transition costs, the question of distributional costs. trade-offs, transitional costs, and distributional costs. Because a lot of the changes we're going through

globally, will have enormous consequences. So how do we deal with those in common when they affect different countries very differently?

REN Xiao

Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University; Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy



I guess I have three points. First, I'd like to echo Colin Bradford's point on pluralism, which I think is an excellent point. Because pluralism is a fundamental fact of the world in terms of political and economic systems, values, cultures, civilizations, histories, whatever. You just need to name it. So, it is a fundamental fact of the world. And therefore, it is the starting point of any talk about the world, about relations, about anything. Pluralism just means difference, meaning that there are all kinds of differences in the world. And that leads to my second point.

The question is, how do we treat, how do we handle differences? 51 years ago, when President Nixon left the White House for his historic visit to China in 1972, people gathered together at the White House, members of the Cabinet, members of Congress, and other people. President Nixon said to the group, saying that, "Well, the government of the People's

Republic of China and the government of the United States have differences, but they do not have to be enemies." I think that spirit has to be inherited by us today. To go one step further, in my opinion, differences do not necessarily lead to conflict, but also differences could be a source of inspiration. Because things are different, one can learn from the other sides, other people about many things. So, we must go one step further by pointing out that differences could be a source of inspiration for our progress and advance.

However, well, I believe that the world would be a better place if the American policymakers accept this philosophy, that differences could be a source of inspiration, a source of progress for us all. I say this because it is based on my long-time observation of the United States, politics, foreign policy, and philosophy. The United States has a very strong motivation, a sense of mission to change the world. The United States, as a national character, the country, is exceptional in terms of it has a very strong motive to change the world and to make the others more like "us," "us" meaning the United States. Now, China is different, and China is rising, and thus China is a threat. This logic is very problematic, in my opinion. Nowadays, the US policymakers use the term competition to characterize its relationship with China. And that, in my view, flows from the above-mentioned logic, but at least it is questionable. At least it is questionable. Someone is a threat simply because he is different or that country is different. It's very, very problematic. And it's wrong. I think, to use competition as a term to characterize the relationship between US-China, is at least too simplistic because that is only a part of the relationship. The relationship is very broad-based. It has many dimensions, including people to people. So, I don't think we can just use competition to characterize the US-China relationship. So, we need to rethink about it. We need to rethink about it very, very seriously.

Let me end by echoing Dr. Pillsbury's comments. I think you're quite right by saying that communication, good communication, and timely communication are very, very important for our bilateral relationship. However, to blame the other side is easy. Well, I believe we, in the room, have reasons, have legitimate reasons to blame the Chinese government and to blame the US government. We have probably many reasons to do so. That is easy. But that is not very useful. For instance, in the case of Defense Minister Lee, when he was and is still sanctioned by the US government. How can we accept the proposal for our defense minister and your defense secretary to have a meeting? It would be very difficult for us to accept that because that is simply an issue of dignity, right? So, for me, that is very easy to understand.

And I hope our American colleagues and friends can understand that too. So, the issue was not to blame but to have good dialogue on that.

CUI Fan

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; Professor, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)



Thank you very much. I got this topic. I think this is a big topic, but my time is little, so I made a little preparation for it. Just now, we talked about trade negotiations. Actually, the Secretary of Commerce of the United States, when visiting China at that time, the two sides just established ministerial advice, ministerial dialogue mechanisms. And then the finance ministry of the two countries also established a financial dialogue mechanism too. So, I think these dialogue mechanisms are smooth.

And just now, we mentioned trade negotiations. I think we're trying to go deeper into it. I want to share with you my personal observations about the trade negotiations. We know that the appellate system of the WTO is almost stopped, so it is in crisis. Now, we are concerned about this. Can we have any rules that can be mutually or universally accepted by both China and the United States?

We all recognize the market economy, but China's market economy is based on socialism. We allow different ownerships. But in the West, their market economy is based on private ownership. So, for a long time, that has not ensured the smooth operation of the WTO system because the WTO has the unbiased rule, meaning no prejudice against State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). So that means that the recognition of a country's ownership should be within the scope of a country's jurisdiction. That is also reflected in the CPTPP and many other agreements. In addition to the WTO, according to the EU also, their rules will not affect other countries' provisions about ownerships, so that reflects the inclusiveness of different ownerships.

So, we need to ensure that different economies at different stages of development with different systems can enjoy common development. But at the same time, our international trading rules need to be harmonized, whether it is based on public ownership or private ownership, whether it is SOEs, or private companies should compete equally. The SOEs should not have any advantages because of its preferences from the government.

So, I believe the reform of WTO should reflect inclusiveness and harmonization. And we should honor competitive neutrality and also ownership equality. And we need to improve the subsidy rules. And we should also ensure balance and equality in terms of procedural topics. We need to ensure that the outcome should be implemented. But instead, for some emerging issues, we could use the method of consultation instead of dispute settlement, e.g., like the Investment Facilitation Development agreement that was just concluded; we had this rule for sustainable investment. This is a very good case.

And so, the experience of China over the past 40 years of reform is that we need to give full play to both the market and government. China's success in infrastructure, solar, wind, and new energy EVs is a very good case in point. Today, we're facing global issues, so I think that we should encourage China and the West to learn from each other to find a way forward. Thank you.

WANG Lili

Deputy Dean of National Academy of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China



Firstly, I'd like to thank CCG and CWD for providing today's platform for scholars from different countries to communicate with each other. I'm so honored to participate in this panel discussion. So, my research mainly focused on public opinion, public diplomacy, and US country-specific studies. I served as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution for one year back in 2008, and last year, I spent six months at Harvard University. Currently, I serve as the Deputy Dean of the National Academy of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China. So based on my observation and my research, I want to share three viewpoints. I will be very brief.

So firstly, I think, with the dynamic trend in the strength, the strategic competition between China and the US is likely to become the defining feature of the 1st half of the 21st century. Whether such competition will be rational or wizard that might harm the whole world will depend on the policy choice and political wisdom of both sides. So far, I think we still have the opportunity window to build, to find common ground, to promote cooperation and maintain stability in Sino-US relations and Sino-Western relations.

Secondly, there is an urgent need for China and the US to rebuild basic trust and enhance dialogue among multiple entities, fields, and channels, to construct a framework of competitive cooperation and work together with countries around the world to address global crises and build a community with shared future for mankind. If China and the US cannot avoid confrontation or even a war, it will be a devastating disaster for the entire human civilization. So, to avoid disaster, it is really necessary for China and us to have an accurate understanding of each other. Any underestimation or overestimation can lead to incorrect strategic judgment.

So lastly, I would like to say in China-US relations and global governance, think tanks play a really important role in idea generation, discourse, negotiation, and public opinion dissemination. The professionalism, independence, openness, and innovation of think tanks enable think tanks like us to transcend the difference among nation-states, conduct cross-national and cross-disciplinary, even cross-different field and ideological uncommon challenge facing human society, and promote international cooperation. Today's exchange and dialogue actually are precisely playing the important role of think tanks in international relations. OK, I will stop here. Thank you.

Matt Ferchen

*Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center at Yale University
Law School*



Thanks, Colin. I was going to bore you with a discussion about my interest in what I've been speaking about the last week—economic statecraft and questions of derisking and decoupling. But, uh, anyone who wants to talk to me about that, we can maybe do that later. Colin has already heard me on this a few times in the last few days, but this discussion has just spurred me to maybe make a slightly different intervention on this question of pluralization. And I guess there are just a couple of thoughts that I have. And they mostly center on how we can include younger people from different parts of the world in this. I'm aware that those of us sitting around the table are not maybe the youngest folks in the room. And I think it's really important that we think about what pluralization means in terms of generations to come, especially leaders who are going to have to take on the mantle of these massive challenges that we're all talking about here, and especially at a time when we've been disconnected from one another, when there are misunderstandings based on those disconnections.

Professor Zhu, you were talking about these huge changes that have happened in the US. How you understand that? As a researcher of American politics, it's hard enough for those of

us who are from there or who work on it, and I would say the same, or even more challenging, for those of us who have spent time trying to understand how things work in China, domestically and in foreign relations. These are massive challenges for those of us who have spent time trying to teach these issues. It's a big challenge. I would just say that it's really important that we try to include younger generations, students, and not just from the United States and China, or even in Europe, all of where I have taught, but also in other parts of the world where this impact of US-China rivalry is felt the most intensely—Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa. And I know there are students here from those different places, but I just think it's really important that as we talk about pluralization, that we keep this on our mind in terms of how to do good work, good research, and also come up with practical problem-solving for shared challenges. Thank you.

Heiwai Tang

Director of the Asia Global Institute and Associate Dean of the Business School, the University of Hong Kong (HKU)



In the interest of time, I'm just going to make three points. I actually had a prepared speech, but I'm going to skip it because I was so inspired since this morning, and also heard a lot in

this session. First of all, thank you, Henry Wang, for creating this opportunity for me to speak. This is a wonderful event. This is exactly what we need to have a lot more of in both China and the United States. The first point I want to make is related to this morning's session when people talked about respect and dialogue. And I think the ultimate goal is to have more mutual understanding between the two countries, as well as trying to build trust between them. And I have to say, you know, I come from Hong Kong, and I taught in the United States for over 15 years. One thing that I realized in the US is that academics, I'm talking about academics, increasingly had difficulty coming to this part of the world just to engage in some regular, normal academic activities. I tried my best to invite some of my friends in the US teaching in public universities to come to Hong Kong to give academic talks. And they told me they don't want to do it, not because they find Hong Kong to be very dangerous. It's because they had to go through multiple levels of approvals in the universities and requirements from the IT department in the university for them to bring an empty laptop to Hong Kong. OK. So, I think this is not encouraging for people to exchange ideas and to learn about each other, and I'm really seeing a downward spiral due to these kinds of restrictive policies. My former colleague, Hal Brands, at Johns Hopkins SAIS, wrote a piece in 2017 published in Bloomberg magazine, pointing out a very obvious point, saying that during the Cold War era, there were a lot of students studying Russian, the language, and also the country, the Soviet Union. But now, in 2023, he started seeing basically older universities shutting down departments on China, on Chinese history, on China studies. And this is not helpful for the Americans to know something more about China. And I'm pretty sure the same thing is happening in mainland China too. And again, living in Hong Kong, I have the luxury to basically go to the US without much restriction. So that's my first point.

My second point is related to the title of this session, which is pluralism. I think I would like to add a word that is related, and that is decentralization. When we look at global macro phenomena, de-dollarization, decoupling, deglobalization, whatever words that start with the letter "d", we tend to connect them to geopolitics right away. But in fact, technologies are also creating these kinds of trends, allowing countries to outsource from multiple places, allowing companies not to produce everything in one single location. So, I think we need to think harder about why we are living in such a world that is increasingly more fragmented, more fractured. Partly because of geopolitics, but also partly because of new technologies like AI, blockchains, whatever.

The third point I want to make is that, due to the tension between the United States and China, there are up and rising star countries in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Latin America. So those new emerging markets are exactly what we are going to see in the next five to ten years. We are indeed moving towards a multipolar world. And I understand, sort of the underlying meaning of Professor Nye's statement this morning. I think we are too obsessed with looking at the two biggest powers in the world and focus too much on the tension and ignore the global South, the rest of the world, and those are our strategic partners. No country wants to take sides. If you go to Southeast Asia, I would bet, besides the Philippines, most of the countries would say, I don't want to take sides, don't force me to do so. And, importantly, I'm happy to see new regional economic and trade agreements, like RCEP, or the new Brics that has six new members. And I think many countries are giving up relying on some improving relationship between the two powers. And they're starting to do something important for their economies. And they don't want to be trapped in these many years of geopolitical tension between the two powers. So, these are my three points. I could make more, but I should let Emanuel and others speak. Thank you.

Emanuel Yi Pastreich

President, The Asia Institute



I want to say that Chinese is a common international language, when Chinese people start speaking in English, it makes it difficult for those who don't know English to participate in our discussions. Therefore, I am basically against it. Opinions should be expressed in one's native language. But I think that it will cause some problems because this is an international setting, so I'll be speaking in English instead, though I can speak Chinese.

Confucius mentioned the idea of the rectification of names, let's say, 正名一词, the names and things should be in harmony together. And this is the primary cause of problems and breakdown in governance. And I think if we look at both the American and the Chinese side, that break is really at the core. And since we don't talk so much about it in many of these discussions, I'll go out on a limb and say a couple of words.

First, I'm going to talk about the United States, but everything I say applies to China, although with Chinese characteristics. First is the government. Obviously, the government is critical, but we see a radical tendency to privatize the government, whether it's in the legislature, in which government-elected officials and staff members go work for hedge funds for several years to enrich themselves, or the outsourcing of processes to for-profit

organizations with their own conflicts of interest. This spills over into the military, which is also increasingly and intelligently outsourced, often to multinational corporations whose interests do not correspond with the nation-state necessarily. And with the word "bank," I'd like to say that the term "bank" we used, but in fact, in many cases, it no longer corresponds with "bank" in the sense that we knew it 40 years ago, or even 15 years ago. The nature of banks and the nature of banking, the nature of money, has profoundly shifted, and the term, the concept, has not kept up with these transformations. Journalism, the passing on of accurate information to the people about what's happening in the world, has also been transformed by the nature of journalism and its commercialization, and this has had a terrible effect, both in the United States and China and globally. And finally, I think the most serious, although it's probably not discussed that much, is the terms "science" and "technology." I've had a lot of problems, especially in China, but also the United States. People use the term "science" and "technology" together as if they're the same thing. In fact, science is the complete opposite of technology. Science is the philosophical pursuit of truth, using a variety of methods, and the scientific method being the most prominent, to ascertain what is accurate or true. Technology is a process or a system which produces a result, and often they're in conflict. As we know, in this digitalized world, in which we have systems of technology which often produce untrue results. Thank you.

HE Weiwen

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; former Commercial Counsellor at Chinese Embassy in New York and San Francisco



I would like to make three points. First, on managing China-US relations. I'm not sure whether we can use the term "China-US bipolar dynamics," because we are not in a bipolar world. Nonetheless, maintaining a stable China-US relationship is of vital importance for world stability and prosperity. Over the past few months, we have witnessed an interesting phenomenon. On one side, the differences between the two countries are intensifying. On the other side, the tensions between the two countries are mounting. This might become the new normal in the coming months and even years ahead because both countries are seeking ways to stabilize the relationship based on the UN charter and principles, namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. Regardless of our significant differences, we can maintain a stable state-to-state relationship. This will also enlighten our relations with other Western countries. That's one point.

The second point is to enhance China-Western relations. The China-US relationship, no matter how important, is only a part of China-West relations. We need to adopt a broader

perspective. Did you know that 50% of China's trade is with Asia? Another 20% is with Europe. Only 16% of China's trade is with North America. Over the past ten years or more, plurilateral mechanisms have played an increasingly important role in stabilizing the global situation and addressing the world's pressing issues. We should continue this approach. While we aim to strengthen China-West relations, our focus should be on specific hot topics.

The third point is to support re-globalization. This might be a relevant topic for China-West Dialogue. Currently, the world is grappling with geopolitical segmentation and geoeconomics fragmentation. This geoeconomics fragmentation now has a term: Homeland Economics. It's becoming prevalent in many countries. However, according to an IMF study, if geoeconomics fragmentation continues, it will curtail global GDP growth by a minimum of half a percent, and up to 12% at most. This would be detrimental for everyone, including China, the West, and the developing world. As we navigate the 4th Industrial Revolution, marked by breakthroughs in big data, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, new energies, and new materials, the rapidly evolving technologies might outpace the capabilities of all our countries, potentially overshadowing our differences. We should collectively focus on strategies for managing the global supply chain, pinpointing, and addressing differences, and ensuring security in these changing times. How can we optimize a global supply chain for the maximum benefit of all countries and minimize risks? To achieve this, we should collaborate with industrial associations and transnational corporations, drawing from their latest experiences, knowledge, and insights. If we can contribute in this manner, it will be beneficial for both China and the West, as well as the broader global community. Thank you.

George S. Geh

Chief Executive Officer, China Institute in America



Thank you. Maybe I could bring a little bit different perspective than most speakers here today. We all know, politicians come and go. We all know policies change over time. But the cultural aspect, educational aspect of human society, will always stay, right? Which is why 97 years ago, American educators John Dewey and Paul Monroe, and Chinese educators, Mr. Hu Shi and Guo Bingwen, founded what is called China Institute in America in New York City. Now, 97 years later, we are still going on with one mission from day one, which is to build a bridge between the American people and Chinese people through programs in arts and culture, in education, in business. Which is why I'm the CEO of the Institute, and I have my co-chair Peter Walker over there. We are here to participate in this discussion, and we want to make sure the exchanges between the peoples will continue to be strong, especially in today's geopolitical environment. Thank you.

JIANG Shan

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; former Director-General of MOFCOM Department of American and Oceanian Affairs



Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. So, from the very beginning of the morning, I have been listening to what our top experts have in their mind about international affairs and China-US relations. I have been deeply inspired. I engaged in some economic activities between China and the United States for some time. So, I want to share with you from that perspective.

We have experienced economic globalization and China's reform and opening up. I can see that most of you are in your fifties or sixties. So, I think the decades that we have experienced have brought great opportunities to China and to the whole world. And now we are facing unprecedented changes and a lot of dynamics in the international situation. We have seen COVID-19 and the increasing tensions between China and the United States. So, it is very necessary for us to talk about China-U.S. relations, especially the business ties. When we talk about business ties in the past, we often say that business ties are the ballast stone and stabilizer of our relations. Without the business ties, yes, indeed, it is impossible for us to be here today. I still believe that business ties are crucial. As some scholars have put it, during the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union and the United States had no economic ties or

engagements. But in the past four decades, we have become part of each other, and we are inseparable from each other. Our trade rose from 2.5 billion at the establishment of diplomatic ties to 750 billion (according to China), or 690 billion, according to the United States—an increase of several hundreds of folds. So, in the past few decades, our business relations have also gone through ups and downs, and we have experienced a lot of arguments or fierce negotiations. And finally, we can find our consensus for common progress. So, between China and the United States, we have established more than ten mechanisms for dialogue. Economically, we have the strategic economic dialogue and China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. And also, in the early 1990s, the textile products and market access, the joining into the WTO, etc. We had a lot of debate between each other on these topics. We had a lot of verbal fights. But finally, we can see that it turns out to be the fact that we reached an agreement, and we finally joined the WTO.

So, my point is that the US exports to China, e.g., mechanical products, soybean, or services, or US movies into China, e.g., we just watched the Oppenheimer. We will never forget the McCarthy era when it hurt the scientists of the United States, and we do not want to see the bad impacts of protectionism on the benefits of the two peoples. So, in one world, economic ties have brought tangible benefits to both countries. They are good for our consumers and also promoters of regional and global economies. When we talk about decoupling, actually, the past 40 years, we have already established complete ties and bonds and connections in terms of supply chains. That is the result of our exchanges. It is not happening within one particular country, but rather, it goes beyond one country into the whole region, the whole world. So, if now we want to cut it off, which took 40 years to be established, does that mean we will take another four decades to rebuild it? So that will be lose-lose.

So according to some experts, when China's trade transfers to other developing countries, that will be good for those countries, indeed, but in this process of transfer, it will also be negative too, e.g., infrastructure, ports, roads, water, electricity and gas, labor. China has a lot of advantages in all those areas. When those replaceable goods move to other developing countries, those developing countries do not have as good advantages as China. So, the export price to the United States will be higher; the US consumers will have to shoulder the burden of a high cost.

Of course, we can tap deeper into this topic. However, I don't think it is the right time for us to talk about decoupling. Rather, we need to talk about dialogue and negotiation and working together. Just now, some friends talked about the 1st phase or the 2nd phase of dialogue, but

actually, in the past, we achieved our progress today after going through all rounds of negotiations. And now we have restored the three working groups between the governments—economic, financial, and commercial at the deputy ministerial level. So, through certain negotiations, we can serve to resolve the problems. And also, the export control, and people-to-people exchange limitations or restrictions are also bad for our contacts. I believe I remember, in the past, 5 million visitors traveled between China and the United States, and every day, over 100 flights were flying between China and the US. But today, we can never surpass or achieve that level. So, what we need to do is to restore our normal people-to-people exchanges, and through negotiations, we need to build trust and remove the conflicts or differences of opinions. And we need to expand further our market in terms of rules, development, management, and standard development. We also need to further open our market. We have over 20 pilot free trade zones, and in our pilot free trade zones, we can do a lot of experiments. At the same time, China and the US should make the cake bigger because our total economy accounts for more than 40% of the world economy. So as someone said this morning, our interests outweigh the conflicts in energy and food and climate; we have a lot of comparative advantages that we could leverage, e.g., I said a few days ago in petrochemicals and energy, China has a lot of advantages. In terms of agriculture, elderly care, and climate change, there are many opportunities for us to tap. So, we should focus on tapping these potentials to make greater contributions to the region and to humanity.

XU Zhengzhong

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; Vice President of the International Institute for Strategic Studies



Today, I'd like to briefly address an important development in China-U.S. relations, given the time constraints. We are witnessing a crucial shift towards a pattern characterized by competition, cooperation, and mutual benefits. As we step into the era of the digital economy, there's a fundamental transformation in the competitive landscape. The traditional notion of finding balanced prices has become obsolete, and the landscape of operating systems has shifted from multiple providers to universal acceptance of a single system. This marks the emergence of a new paradigm. Within this framework, a novel economic, political, and social phenomenon has surfaced, aptly termed "cooperation"—a blend of competition and cooperation that is shaping new markets.

we know that relations between states are largely founded on those between enterprises. E.g., in 1984 the 1st Kentucky opened in Beijing; in 1990, and McDonalds also came. the KFC did a lot of research, but McDonalds just open to a store opposite KFC. They brought fast foods, American style fast food, into China. The same thing happened between Chinese companies among Hisense and Haier, Mengniu Dairy and Yili. in general, digital economy, or corporate

competitions, have taught us a lesson that we could expand the market through competition, increase the benefits for all peoples. I think that this is also the EU and China are now developing 3rd party markets. So, in the interest of time, this is all I have to share. Thank you.

LÜ Xiang

*CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; Research Fellow of Institute of American Studies,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*



There is news that we may have missed today. The governor of California has arrived in Hong Kong and will soon visit Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Beijing. If we look at the editorial by Global Times yesterday and if we look at the statement by the Californian government, we may get the impression that the US and China are very friendly countries in the world. So, we need to consider that there are very good moments of cooperation on regional levels in both countries. We see that California has two valleys: the Sacramento Valley and the San Joaquin Valley. The San Joaquin Valley produces half of the fruits and nuts in the US, and the demand for this trade is significant. If we consider these positive factors more in the bilateral relations, I believe the future between the two countries,

although I don't want to use the word "bright," will at least not be as pessimistic as it feels now.

I'm more than delighted to see my old friend Mr. Pillsbury. He made every effort to come to Beijing. We had an in-depth conversation, and I believe our discussions reached the leadership and decision-making levels of both sides. It played a crucial role in the subsequent signing of the phase one trade agreement between China and the US. But after the signing of the agreement, shortly afterward, COVID-19 broke out and became a global pandemic. We saw US politics become chaotic, and we still haven't seen a correction in this chaotic trend in politics in the US. This visit by the governor of California, I think, is more representative of the future of our relations. Under Trump's administration, when things were tough, we were able to reach an agreement. So, in today's environment, I think it's all the more possible that we can reach a better agreement. Thank you.

LI Chen

Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China



I also want to make three points. First, I believe stability is not something optional for the international community; it's the foundation of international society. Because I recall

Secretary Blinken arguing a few weeks ago that geopolitical instability is a feature of the current international order. I think the US strategy, the competition strategy, includes toleration, even taking advantage of unstable situations. For example, in the recent Biden administration's policy towards the Middle East conflict, the US even takes advantage of the Middle East conflict to promote more budgets. Not only for the Middle East and the European situation but also for programs all course. We need to realize that if we want to promote stability, we should constrain allies, and we should promote more cooperation among the great powers. So, I believe the major responsibility of all the great powers includes reducing and constraining instability and promoting stability. We have to facilitate a transition from instability to stability.

The second thing I want to mention is the revival of multilateralism in crisis management and conflict management because right now we are facing major crises in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the Asia Pacific as well. I don't think that any single great power or any single bloc can dominate in the management of these crises and conflicts. So, we need a division of labor, and we need some trust among great powers to do crisis management and conflict management.

The third point I want to mention is the so-called AI arms control. Some people recently wrote articles arguing that we need to learn lessons from nuclear arms control during the Cold War for the arms control of AI today. There are some differences between AI and nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons are primarily just that, AI is a technology that can be applied to both civilian life and the military. I think the US approach to AI, in relation to China, is a little confusing. Because if we want to suppress the AI infrastructure and AI research and development in China, it's quite challenging to have any serious negotiations with China on the so-called military risk of AI.

So, I believe we need a two-track approach to AI arms control. Track one: cooperation and exchanges on the application of AI for the welfare of all people. And secondly, serious discussions about the uncertainties and risks of AI to both civilian life and military applications. Thank you.



IV. International Norms and Global Engagement Platforms

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Bruno Liebhaberg

Director General, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)



I would like, indeed, to talk for 2 minutes about the link from perhaps the limits to pluralism, and how do we move from the limits to pluralism to international norms and standards, which I think is the topic of this session.

We agree that pluralism is about respect: respect for each other's identity, values, culture, and collective preferences. But one, and it's clear that the fact that you, or I say anyone, is different from me, is not a good reason not to be in business with him. However, there are limits, and the limit today, for instance, is respecting the integrity of a sovereign country. And this has immediate consequences at the international level. I know that you talked about Bali.

I wonder whether you were talking about Bali or Delhi. I think it was Delhi. You talked about the communique that you read.

[**Colin Bradford:** It was Bali. Bali in November 2022.]

Okay, so I'm talking now about Delhi, September 23. And you could see that we tried with our project on the global governance of the digital ecosystems. We tried to push the concept of a global digital board, which would be an inclusive body, where governments, industry, NGOs, civil society would try together to identify the areas on AI, on data, etc., where there are conflicts and it's difficult to move forward. We were blocked because a number of major players told us: "Sorry, Bruno, G20 is not the right forum for that."

So, we went backward, and that is how we had G7, and G7+, G7 plus Hiroshima, which is a way to be as inclusive as possible, not to limit the governance of the world to a limited number of rich countries, but to try to widen it. Though of course, we know that it's not wide enough; there is a limit to it, but it's already an attempt to move forward. So, my point would be, despite the global challenges that we have mentioned, and we could have added a number of others, health for instance, it's clear that we need to concentrate, and that perhaps is the way forward, to concentrate on the strategic issues on which each country cannot afford not to engage. And that's basically, as Henry has mentioned, what's happening in climate. Climate is a good example where we managed to move forward in the right direction.

Now, on digital, we have a number of initiatives, in fact, a myriad of initiatives on AI, and we see that some of those are within the G7+ forum. And I'm happy to see that the UK has taken the initiative of inviting China to the conference that they're going to organize in September. So I think the only way is to manage our differences, to make them coexist. But again, let's not forget that there are limits, because a number of our countries are subject to public opinion. They need to be reelected, and this is something that we also have to take into account. Thank you.

Francoise Nicolas

Director of Center for Asian and Indo-Pacific Studies, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)



I would like to pick up on the points that Henry made, at least two of the three points that he made. And I would be, I guess, a little bit negative. I'm sorry for that. I'll note a caution, which goes a little bit in the same direction as what was said right before.

On climate, I agree with you that it is "the thing" that everybody mentions as the possible area for cooperation. That's the obvious one. The problem is, I think that it is easy to say; it is slightly more complicated to act on climate. There are a number of declarations, but then to walk the talk is slightly more complex. And one problem I see, where it goes to climate, is that you bump into economic interests very quickly, even about climate. If you look at what the US is doing with the IRA. IRA is to help the ecological transition in the US, but then it clashes with other countries' interests. The same thing for the anti-subsidy investigation that the EU is launching. Well, if you exclusively think about climate, you may think that it's a good thing to have cheap electric vehicles coming from China. But we do not see it exactly the same way because of economic interest, because the car industry in Europe is huge, and we don't want the car industry to disappear. So, OK, we agree on climate. We agree that

something should be done about climate, but very, very quickly, national economic interests arise, and this makes things quite complicated. So that's my first point on climate.

The second thing, about infrastructure. So, there are two things I would like to say about infrastructure. Well, the first thing is that infrastructure, at least as far as the digital dimension of it is concerned, is really a package. So, when you have competition, I agree with you that competition may be healthy in infrastructure, that's good. We have Global Gateway, Belt and Road, Build Back Better World, etc. That's good and healthy. The problem is that very often, together with hard infrastructure comes soft infrastructure, standards, norms. And so when you have competition in hard infrastructure, you also have underlying competition in soft infrastructure, in norms and standards. So that may make things slightly more complicated than what we think at first. So that's the first point on infrastructure.

The same thing about the digital realm; it was rightly said before that norms and standards reflect national preferences. I agree with you. And if you look at what digital governance looks like in different parts of the world, they reflect very different philosophies. We have, basically, three digital realms: the EU one, which is more people-centric, I would say, the US one, which is very much big company-centric, and the China one, which is control-dominated. And so, these are three very, very different approaches. And so, it will be quite difficult also to reconcile these various approaches. So, on digital, I don't see much scope for cooperation, at least for easy cooperation. Well, I guess I'll leave it here. And sorry for sounding so negative, but I think we have to be candid and realistic and not naive about the possibilities for cooperation.

DAI Ruijun

Director of the Department of International Human Right Law at Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences



I would like to start with one of the keywords of the Charter of the United Nations, that is human rights. and it is also one of the three pillars of the United Nations. And after that, I would like to try to explore some convergence, if there are some we could work together.

And as for human rights, I think many people may believe they are based on norms stem from the Western civilization, but actually it is not the whole picture. And as we all know, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted in 1948. This year is the 75th anniversary of this document. And this declaration, it's considered as the cornerstone of international human rights law, and it embodies, actually a global moral consensus on human rights. Drafters of this declaration came from both West and East, including China. And the Chinese representative, Dr. Zhang Pengchun, or P. C. Chang, he was the vice-chair of the drafting committee, drafting team of this declaration, and he had successfully incorporated the confusion philosophy into this declaration. Besides Mr. Zhang, there is still another Chinese scholar named Luo Zhongshu, and he had also made some contribution to the birth of international human rights law. Actually, he participated in a survey which was carried out

by the UNESCO in around the 1940s to assist the draft of the Universal Declaration. And Mr. Luo also propose some ideas of the human rights philosophy in China. And because of the time limit, I will not go into detail of his contribution, but most of his contribution, or his proposal, and got positive response in the later international Bill of Human Rights. So studies have already showed that the source of international human rights law are embedded in various civilizations, and the Western view of human rights is only a local discourse. although it is very influential. therefore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is proclaimed as a common standard of achievements of all people and all nations.

Actually, I would like to mention another case, a recent case. It is the 54th session of the Human Rights Council, which was concluded a few days ago. And during this session, a resolution initiated by China and some developing countries, named Promoting and Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Inequalities, was adopted through consensus. Why is this case special? Because firstly, this resolution was adopted by consensus, not by vote. Actually, this is rare in the history of Human Rights Council. because in the past, whenever there is a resolution proposed by China or some developing countries, the Western countries, especially the United States and the UK, would oppose it and ultimately put it to a vote. But this one was adopted by consensus. And secondly, because this resolution is related to the rights of economic, social, and cultural rights. but the EU and the US clearly express their willingness to join in the consensus. This is also rare, because, at least for the United States, is not yet a state party to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. And the United States is always challenging the human rights attributes of economic, social, and cultural rights. So, this adoption of this resolution, maybe, to some extent demonstrate that there might be some convergence, or common sense between the West and East, between the developed and developing countries, even in today's conflict and confrontation era, to reach some consensus in the area of human rights.

at last, when it comes to exploring some convergence beyond the climate change, I think maybe some topics in the area of human rights, such as equality and non-discrimination, protection of rights and freedoms of vulnerable groups, or not let anyone to left behind, especially in the digital age might be some convergence. Thank you.

Shada Islam

Senior Adviser, European Policy Center



Thank you very much for giving me the floor. I'm really, A, very delighted to be here, Henry and Mabel, thank you. And B, to speak after you. Because what I'm going to say is a bit similar, but I'm going to put it a bit differently. I am a senior adviser at the European Policy Center, and I'm a visiting professor at the College of Europe in the Natolin campus. I know that the world likes formality, structures, hierarchies, and a world that is patriarchal in essence adores formality and officialdom. But I think in the world that we live in today, and we're seeing it in our streets of Europe and across the world, there is a real desire for informality and to work to tackle our challenges, not through official structures, but through informal channels. And that is why I think this multipolar world, Colin, that we're talking about, and that you call the shifting coalitions of consensus. And I say often in what I write and what I tell my students, is a mix-and-match world; it's an à la carte world. Countries are not being pushed into silos and channeled into binary choices. They're not doing it. It's spontaneous. And we're seeing it now, and we need it now. We need it now in the Israeli-Palestine conflict; we need it now in Russia and Ukraine. We've seen countries coming in. It's Turkey, it's Qatar. The United States and China cannot handle it; the European Union cannot

handle it on its own. So, we need these alliances. We need these partners to come in at this point. So, this is the first thing: that it's an informal world. This multipolar world is going to break away from the constraints and, I would say, the shackles of institutions where countries will have to work, whether they're Global North or Global South, collective West, global South; they'll have to work together in informal alliances. And these G20 are good for the moment, but it has to break up into smaller groups, minilaterals, plurilaterals, à la carte, I would say.

And the second point that we're seeing now is the importance of young people. Young people are very, very important. I think we have to break away from this generational divide that exists as well, where the policies are being made by elderly gentlemen, if I may put it that way, whereas the young people, as we're seeing in the streets, want peace and reconciliation. I myself am not very young, so I'm saying this, knowing what I'm saying. So the three areas where I think we need to work, of course, are climate change. And my friend Francoise has said very clearly the dangers and challenges there. But I think sustainable development goals, SDGs, I mean, I know that we all sort of talk about the SDGs and then put them away and say, okay, that's done, but those are essential if we're going to build a more equal world, if we're going to protect the vulnerable, if we're going to protect education, health, etc. So I would say multipolarity, in many ways, is a challenge, but I would say that it is also a blessing. It's a reality, and we have to work with it and not try to impose structures on it, which actually will not be of benefit to us. Thank you very much.

SU Hao

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; Founding Director of Center for Strategy and Peace Studies, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU)



Now, I would like to give three points in my presentation. First, I do think that we should go beyond the ideological politics. Unfortunately, when we look around the world, we have been divided into different camps of ideology, right? Democracy or non-democracy. But I think that these kinds of patterns make the world get into a tragedy. You know, patterns like the Cold War period, and now we're heading closer towards the new Cold War. That will be a real problem. But I do think that all of us would like to go beyond that kind of Cold War mentality and patterns. That's the reason why we all sit down around the table from all over the world. So, I think that we should do something to go beyond the power politics, the power police, and ideological politics.

And the second point, I would like to say that this world has also been composed of plural cultures and civilizations. Of course, we are different, right? But regarding the background of culture, nobody, not even a country, can take the opposition against each other. So, I do think that our American friends would like to respect Confucius, right? And our Chinese would like to respect the Western Jesus Christ, or other philosophical key scholars in the Western

Academy. So, I think that, regarding the world, even if the world has differences between us because of the background of culture, we should share this culture. That's the reason why our Chinese would like to set a value, which is a civilizational value, not just a critical value. Our Chinese love the freedom and democracy that originate from the Western academy and civilization. And I do think that our Western scholars also love Chinese civilizational values.

So, the third point, I would say that maybe we should reshape a new style of politics. I would like to use a word called civilization politics. Go beyond ideological politics and power politics. We know that in the 19th century, power politics caused so many wars among our human society. And ideological differences caused the Cold War in the 20th century, and now in the 21st century. We should try to move ahead towards the civilization politics, and mean all countries based upon our own civilization. For example, like in East Asia, China, Japan, South Korea, or some countries in Southern Asia, will belong to the East Asian civilization. We should have our own community based upon our civilization value. Of course, the United States is a representative of Western civilization. That's good. China respects American civilization, or Western civilization. So that's the reason why I would say that East and West could sit down together, like this round table. And even I would like to propose to Huiyao, maybe next year, if you have set the themes for this dialogue, maybe give a word like this "We Forum." "We Forum" means West and East. So West and East. We also belong to humanity, right? And we share our original global civilizations. And also, even though we have different civilization backgrounds, we can sit down together as human beings. So, the We Forum could unite the East and the West for our human activities, like anti-globalization and like climate change in the global community. Okay, that's my point. Thank you.

LI Huailiang

Dean, Institute for a Community with Shared Future, Communication University of China (CUC)



Today, our topic is the dialogue between China and the USA. Really, we have one dialogue. But usually, frankly, dialogues between China and the US were not like factual dialogues. They were more like arguments. It is normal to have arguments, and arguments are not a bad thing. The debate between China and the US is basically rooted in the following three levels. First, the interests. China and the United States are each other's important trading partners. China and the United States share many common economic interests. If this partnership is undermined, both sides will suffer huge losses. But China and the United States also have different interests. China is a developing country, and so far, China's greatest interest is development. The United States is already a developed country and is the richest country in the world. Development is not its greatest interest. Its greatest interest is to maintain hegemony, economic hegemony, military hegemony, and cultural hegemony. There will certainly be conflict between the two largest economies. One is for development, and the other for hegemony.

Second, responsibility. There are different understandings of rules. In the past few decades, the international economic balance of power has changed profoundly. but the global governance system has failed to reflect the new changes and is not representative and inclusive enough. An important difference between China and the US is the different understanding of rules. When Americans talk about rule-based international relations, they mean a set of rules. The Chinese also speak of rules, but they refer to a different set of rules, that is, an international system, with the United Nations at its core and an international order based on international law.

The third is value. It is a different understanding of political systems and political values and development path. There are fundamental differences between Chinese and American political values. Americans consider their nation as a city on a hill, and the world should look up. The political values of the United States are universal values, and the whole world should adopt such universal values. Any government that does not conform to their democratic model is authoritarian. What Americans understand as modernization is westernization. The Chinese believe that countries have different national conditions, different cultures, and different histories. Countries have the right to choose different paths of development.

The debate on the three levels will continue for a long time and will not go away anytime soon. And there is no need to rush to complete agreement. Our mission is to transfer argument into real dialogue. How? It is a good way to seek truth from facts. More inclusiveness, more constructive, more mutual respect, more equality, more negotiations, less prejudices, less speaking from the position of strength. Treat each other as equals, respect each other, and then we can hear each other. Thank you.

ZHU Xufeng

Dean of School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University



My name is Zhu Xufeng, from Tsinghua University, Dean of the School of Public Policy and Management, and the executive director of the Institute for Sustainable Development Goals. Today's sessions, the topic is the international norm and international cooperation. I think for international organizations, the most inclusive and authoritative international organization is the United Nations, which plays the most important role in resolving international conflicts, economic, social development, and sustainable development in the world. The UN 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goals was adopted in 2015, includes 17 goals across economic, social, and environmental domains and serves as an important document for global development. Since the adoption of the 2030 agenda, countries have made significant progress in implementing sustainable development goals. Some goals have already been resolved, achieved, such as China's early completion of poverty alleviation tasks by 2020. In addition, the international community is strengthening cooperation and coordination to jointly address global challenges.

However, in the process of implementing the United Nations Development Agenda, there are also a lot of difficulties and challenges. First, some developing countries lack the economic,

technological, and human resources to implement the sustainable development goals. The second is some developing countries still face internal and external imbalances in political, economic, and social aspects. In addition, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, in particular, has strengthened the imbalance among the countries, especially the LDCs, Least Developed Countries that have just lifted themselves out of poverty, have rapidly returned to poverty. So, in terms of China, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Development Initiative in 2021. The initiative proposed that developing countries should strengthen their capacities to achieve economic, social, and environmental coordination and development and eliminate poverty. The GDI is of great significance for promoting the implementation of the 2030 agenda for SDGs globally. First, the GDI provides important support and guidance for the LDCs to achieve sustainable development. This initiative emphasizes the importance of poverty alleviation, promoting economic growth, improving education and health levels, and protecting the environment, and proposes significant action plans and goals. Second, the GDI has received widespread support from the international communities, including the United Nations, governments of countries, and international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The establishment of a group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative in 2022 shows that they have a strengthened partnership. So, in summary, the GDI provides important support and assistance for the least developed countries to achieve the 2030 agenda. So currently, the implementation of GDI still requires joint efforts and cooperation for all parties, bridging the differences in preferences in opinions and politics that exist among different countries, and further promoting the achievement of the sustainable development agenda. In the future, we need the international community to continue to strengthen cooperation, jointly promote the globe to achieving sustainable development goals. Thank you.

TU Xinquan

Dean, China Institute for WTO Studies, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)



Thank you, Chair. I'm Tu Xinquan from the China Institute for the WTO Studies, UIBE. So I'm a WTO man, not a tariff man. But to be honest, I'm afraid that the effective functioning of the international system does not depend on rules or norms, but on the leadership of the hegemony or the cooperation of hegemonic states. In the case of the world trading system, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the US has gradually lost its confidence and interest in sustaining the multilateral trading system to pursue and defend its economic interests. The shrinking of US manufacturing, the rising internal income inequality, the narrowing gap between the US and China are perceived to be the outcome of the multilateral trading system, which offers more opportunities to China's rise.

The permanent goal of the US as a hegemony is to maintain its hegemony permanently. Although China repeatedly claims that it is not intending to take over the US position, the US doesn't believe it and even heightens its suspicion over China's hidden ambition or conspiracy. At the same time, China also believes that currently the US will take whatever measures to contain China's development and sustain US diplomacy. So the fundamental dilemma for the

current world is that there is neither absolute hegemony nor cooperative powers. Therefore, we should not expect the international system could function effectively as in the first two decades after the end of the Cold War. We have to live with this reality that the two competing powers have deep mutual distrust in each other. In my opinion, the best hope for now is to keep the great power competition peaceful as much as possible, both economically and militarily. In terms of economic competition, we should encourage and urge the two major powers to generally stick to the existing WTO rules as well as other international rules and at the same time to reach interim deals about some controversial issues such as national security. Most importantly, the two powers should give each other more policy space to take certain restrictive measures to defend their essential security interests and agree not to take tit-for-tat retaliation for their domestic political purposes. Both sides should exercise restraint in initiating dispute settlement cases regarding national security, since the two sides' ignorance of the WTO rulings will even hurt the authority of the WTO.

Secondly, the two powers are trying to promote more active industry policies in certain sectors. They could walk along with other interested parties to reach temporary or permanent clarifications about the agreement on subsidies and countervailing duty measures, giving more policy space to each other to make and implement their industry policies, especially those related to environmental protection and climate change, which could produce global positive spillovers. Moreover, if economic theories are right, that subsidies won't work finally, just let all of them fail. Domestic politics will punish those incompetent governments.

To conclude, for now, we would better adopt a kind of appeasement policy, with looser constraint on each other, and give more time for both sides to adapt to the evolution of the global power structure. Thank you.

YU Hongjun

CCG Advisor; former Deputy Minister of the International Department, CPC Central Committee



So maybe I'll make an exception. I'll be speaking in Chinese. Thank you for your invitation. I am a CCG advisor and have been engaged in international studies for a long time. I've been deeply inspired today. I want to talk about how to strengthen international norms and increase international cooperation. I think we all feel that we are at a crucial moment. There are a lot of deficits in governance, in development, and we are lacking in cooperation platforms. And the existing international norms and international rules and relations have been challenged, and China's role in the world has also been misunderstood to a great extent. Actually, China is working hard to become an advocate of respecting international norms. Since the end of the Cold War, the world is developing toward Multipolarity, and economic globalization has also experienced a lot of twists and turns. The international community hopes that the big countries will show more responsibilities in international governance to ensure that we will build a community of shared future for development and for a common destiny. And Chinese leaders, ten years ago, already said that in dealing with other countries, our goal is to find common ground and promote lasting peace and build peace and prosperity in the world. So to

follow international rules and uphold international governance and promoting international cooperation are the choices made by China. Our goal is actually to find the convergent points among different countries and share responsibilities with different countries. And through the universally accepted approaches, we will work together to find a way for common growth and development.

Second, actually, China has also made specific and practical proposals for global governance, e.g., China wants to participate in science and technology governance through increased cooperation. And second, we have taken the initiative to make good use of international initiative resources, to participate in the international innovation networks and build our capacity for rulemaking in the world. And to participate in environmental governance, we want to build good ecology in the world, and we want to ensure that our actions are environmentally friendly, and we want to find the solutions to sustainable development. And China wants to participate in security governance. We hope that we can combine our security with the common security of all mankind. That is why I have been the most active in the international peacekeeping missions. We are engaging in the fight against terrorism, we are engaging in the cooperation against human trafficking, against drug trafficking, etc. So those are all good examples.

Finally, also want to say that China has always been following the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. We are not engaging in geopolitical little camps or blocs. We are against parapolitics, cold war mentality, or bloc politics. We believe that the developed countries are not in a position to dominate world affairs. Global governance should reflect the rights and needs of all parties, so that we will build consensus for joint actions. So, without cooperation, there will be no governance. And China has never denied the necessity for developed countries to participate in international governance. We want to work together with the world to promote global governance, e.g., China, the United States actually have a lot of shared interests in global governance. That is something made clear by President Xi Jinping. To be together in this process will enable us to make good use of our advantages and work together to address global challenges. And China also will make a pioneering effort, take proactive actions towards this end. And President Xi has also made vivid descriptions about this Chinese commitment. We want to build efficiency. We want to fight corruption. And that is also an important requirement from the G20. Actually, G20 is another important platform for addressing global challenges. We hope that it will play a bigger role. In recent years, we have heard a lot about the three global initiatives. They are in line with the BRI actually. They are

all aimed at expanding third-party cooperation. Our purposes are simple: We want to ensure equity in development, ensure reliable security, expand our cooperation. And to implement these new initiatives, we will build more platforms for cooperation for the world. We hope that the whole world will take a more active part in the development of all those platforms. That is all from me. Thank you for listening.

Martin Albrow

Emeritus Professor of the University of Wales and Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS)



Thank you very much, Colin. I wonder if I can be a bit autobiographical. I can remember seeing the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when it happened. I was very lucky. I was eight years old. In those days, a young kid could go to the cinema and see newsreels. The first newsreel would be about American Cowboys, Roy Rogers. And then, after the film, you would see the passage news. The passage news showed the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For an eight-year-old, it was pretty shocking. In other newsreels, you saw the results of the incarceration and the burning of Jews in German concentration camps, and you saw the open pits, the lime pits, and the skeletons. This was a vivid impression for an eight-

year-old of what clearly was something dramatic. And it was marked, of course, by President Truman who said, "We have entered a new era." I think this was probably the first time "new era" was expressed in global politics. Intellectuals of the time followed suit. The great German philosopher, Karl Jaspers echoed that. The great philosopher of civilizations, Arnold Toynbee echoed that. Now, this was the immediate impact of the end of the Second World War. Of course, the end of the First World War had a similar intellectual impact. And Toynbee himself was echoing someone named Oswald Spengler, who wrote a book called "The Decline of the West," a forgotten book now, but Toynbee expressed great interest in it and argued that its message was valid for his day. Toynbee himself, of course, was a great admirer of China and saw China as eventually the civilization that could, in fact, provide a more peaceful world.

Now, I give that as the background to what I'm saying, simply because I think you have to look at the long term, and you also need to take account of the fact that, yes, there was wide recognition of the deep differences between civilizations then, throughout the 20th century. My own feeling is that we possibly overestimate the contribution that understanding between civilizations can bring. After all, let's face it, within the Arab world, the divisions go back 1,400 years or 1,300 years. They still haven't been resolved. That's only within the Arab world.

Misunderstandings at the level of civilization are not something we can allow to impede us in dealing with the existential crises of our time. The first existential crisis was, of course, the recognition that nuclear weapons and the discovery of the power of the atom could destroy human life. The next existential crisis we've already been talking about is environmental pollution and possibly the degradation of the environment to end human existence. The third one came rapidly after, which was global warming. And the fourth one came even more rapidly after that, which is the potential of artificial intelligence to end human life. Four existential crises coming faster and faster. Honestly, they are not solved by reconciling civilizations. There's no way we can do that because it's not civilizations that negotiate with each other. It's human beings. It's people. It's not even primarily, I would suggest, governments. When we meet as a group of think tanks and focus entirely on what governments do, we forget the fact that the world is now a multiplicity of organizations that cross boundaries. We only think of the most prominent ones, like Greenpeace or the Red Cross, but the multiplicity of organizations is enormous. It's from those that I trust we can see a future. And it's those that I believe will be more important in dealing with existential crises

because there we have the experts. We have the people who find out things, create things. They actually handle the technologies. Scientists are there to direct those efforts. And we have to remember, modernization was never led by countries. Modernization was led by scientists, technologists, and so on. So, we ought to be negotiating directly. My view is, broadly, what I've called in the past, global civil society. It's global civil society. We need the next conference, Henry, yes, the next one is for you and your center to have a conference for global civil society. And then, I think we might get a bit further forward in dealing with the existential crisis of the moment for humans on this earth. We don't have a lot of time. We truly don't have a lot of time, in my view.

Christian Kastrop

Professor for Public Finance at the Free University Berlin; former State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Germany



I would first of all, thanks a lot for this conference. That's really a great thing. Also, to the Chinese friends and to the China-West Dialogue, it's really an awesome gathering.

I'm from Global Solutions Initiative, which is kind of an offspring of the G20 group. So, we work with the respective presidencies, and we have rights now starting to work with the

Brazilian presidency on their G20 portfolio. And so I will bring more into practice. And I know quite a bit about the G20 because I was part of the program team in the late nineties when the G20 was then a proposal and was then decided at the so-called Cologne Summit. So that's a very interesting history, but I will not allude longer into that. But what we clearly see right now, on top of what happened to the G20, in fact, we really see, and I would support all those speakers before you said that there is a kind of, at least yeah, it's a substantive breakdown of the global governance and over 70 years consensus of an after-war system. And I have to say immediately this is for sure not useful any longer for the global future, for our common global future.

So yes, there's this famous saying, "Houston, we have a problem," and I would say it again, it's not just Houston, but the world. We really have a problem. So, and of course, we have this problem. In spite of all these pressing problems, we have the global commons, the Global Common Goods. And there were mentioned here already. So, it's about, I just had one of the panels of the World Health Summit in Berlin two weeks ago, and it is really, really a big issue. Pandemia is looming again. We have a health issue, uh. We have energy. We have natural resources, which are very uneven, distributed all over the globe. We have an issue with the climate, anyway. But beyond, it's also digital and artificial intelligence. We need to also have some rules of the game here, or say, really, at least a little bit of a common global ethics of what we do with this, also with respect to, to, disinformation privacy and all other issues you all know very well. And of course, they have to be seen in different political environments. And they are all, in a way, to be respected. Let me also say that very clear.

And then there is, of course, the issue of science and technology. Value chains will also change a lot, and this will also influence our economic system to a large degree. We will now talk more about the security of global value chains and about the sustainability of global value chains, and we will probably less talk about ultimate efficiency of global value chains. And so, it's not just the cheapest alternative, it's the best alternative, given all other things of common goods which are involved here. and then let me also mention one point where we really try also to work with our annually Global Solutions Summit in Berlin in May, that's about reducing inequality and really trying to get the people along again. And this is what we mean with the recoupling the global society to the given environment. So, what are we going to do now? Coming back to my open sentence about that we have kind of a collapse of global governance, and I think I would be rather open in formulating a new, say, global governance system. And I think we need it, and it will take time. I'm pretty sure we will not solve it today

or in the next year. But I think we should really accept a multipolarization. We should really accept that every player in the world, and it's not just the old global players from the late fifties or the late sixties, must have an equal say here. I think this is very important. Um, hard to begin. Maybe we can also check for the new global governance, again, an institutional reform. We would probably also need some front projects where everybody would like to join in. I think we could probably at least define some of them, and it's one of my pet projects, how to define these projects. We need probably also a flexible geometry of global governance, which means that we do not need any more always unanimity. This will probably not be possible on all issues, but it may be possible on some issues. And we should really refrain from this issue of building certain blocs. I think we are all sitting in the same boat, as we say, and we will all, and this was also alluded here by my pre speaker, that we, we are all in trouble if something goes wrong on global governance and saving the global common goods.

So, I stop here, and what I would just like to remember you at these very topical points, and we really need to solve them. We need global solutions quickly and soon. We do not have another 50 years to fight several philosophies of these. We just have to do the job. Thank you.

WANG Yiwei

CCG Non-resident Senior Fellow; Jean Monnet Chair Professor and Director of International Affairs, Renmin University of China



The world is transforming from the carbon civilization to silicon civilization. Some people say from industrial civilization to digital civilization, or ecological civilization. I think this is the major background of our discussion.

In China, a political narrative we saw the West is "American-led West," 美西方. But in the digital world, American leadership is relatively declining. That's the reason I think the European Union put forward the digital sovereignty. The European Union wants a strategic autonomy. So, you cannot blame the rise of Europe. The challenge to American leadership isn't a new word.

What are implications for China and the Western dialogue? So, for the United States, I think firstly, you should distinguish what kind of challenges are because of China's rise as a power, so power politics, or because of the world transferring to new civilizations. And then the American political system, or civilization, not adapting to this kind of new trend. And then blame China. It's like this globalization, China as a scapegoat. Putting China as the scapegoat cannot solve the Americans' problem. It's like the trade deficit. It's the American, US dollar,

hegemonic power. So, it's not because of China. Made in China too much. So that's very important.

Every country, every civilization, needs to adapt to a new environment. So that's 易经, we learn from that. I think China also found many challenges of the digital civilization. And what's the competition, or dialogue, between China and the West, particularly China and the US? In the morning, many people mentioned about cooperation, competition, but this is always combined together. So, the competition is, who can provide more suitable public goods for the human transformation of civilization? Not public best, that should be public goods. I think the China-US, China-west competition is about that is disregard, of course, cooperation competition combined together.

So, what we understand of this dialogue of China and the West? There's no pure China or pure West. China is in the West. West also in China. It's like we learn from ubuntu: "I am because we are." So, maybe the US defines China. China also defines the US, or the general, or the West. So, the West is not an ideology meaning, but it's also a civilization meaning. It's not the old civilization meaning. It's a new kind of civilization meaning. So, in this regard, I think what's norms competition between China and the West? And we can provide the conclusion is, 1st, we should change that paradigm from the capital-driven to human-oriented scenario. The 2nd, power, and rights always, you know, need to combine together. But it's no power to define rights or right to defend power, they are mutually connected or twin. This is a shared, not as a shared power, shared rise. Even the power and rights also be shared. Thirdly, I think the proposals regionalism of the new initiative competed with each other between China and the United States, for instance, like Belt and Road Initiative, for Americans like B3W, whatever. There is, which community will be most inclusive to every participant on this planet, then may be more welcome. I think the maximum, or the most inclusive, definitely, is what Martin says, a global community of a shared future. Thank you.

CHEN Yang

Executive Director of Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)



Thank you, Chair. My name is Chen Yang. I come from CICIR, the more realistic think tank. When I received the topic about international norms and this global engagement platform, I was a little surprised because I think those concepts are all about global governance. And global governance is a dying concept in such a new era. For example, the chancellor of Germany talked about the "tight winter," and the EU commission, which used to be a strong supporter of global governance, now wants to build the geopolitical commission.

I was so delighted to see so many idealists here to participate in this meeting, to talk about global governance. Frankly speaking, I do not think it's the right time to talk about that. Domestic issues occupy priority in so many countries' agendas, especially big powers. And under this extent, with persistent geopolitical confrontation, there isn't much space or dynamic left for cooperation on international issues.

I just came back from a trip around Paris and Berlin. I heard so many people talk about China. Sadly, I have to say, most of them are negative: de-risking, systemic rival, economic competition with China, and recently, the panic of the Chinese EV. They said China had

dramatically changed its economic, political, and foreign policy style. They mentioned COVID, support for what they perceive as "evil Russia" or Putin, and confrontation with the United States as the causes of the change. We have to change our policy time and time again. And one day, when I woke up, I looked in the mirror. I said, this guy hasn't changed. During the meeting, I looked at the guys around the table. I saw they haven't changed either. But why? Why are there so many differences? Suddenly, I realized that Europe's perception of China has changed. I don't want to judge whether this change is right or wrong, but we have to recognize that it exists and will pervade among social groups for a long time. And they reduce the trust between China and Europe, adding a burden to cooperation in this relationship. Nowadays, as Russia once threatened war and the United States' hostility towards China grows, if Europe and China cannot build mutual trust, the world might tear into two opposite blocs. Who can global governance then count on? So, we need to do something to save the paralyzed systems of our world to avoid human civilization from falling apart.

Firstly, in my personal view, we should focus on facts, not some exaggerated language. Just like saying Europe's security depends on the US, and its economy depends on China. I don't think it's true. If you look at the FDI, China accounts for only 7% of Germany's outflow FDI; the US accounts for 22%. Many scholars criticize China for supporting Russia or Putin, but that's not accurate. If China sided with Russia, the whole dynamic of the Ukraine conflict would change. Many articles and papers suggest China's ambition is to surpass the United States and dominate the world. That's not accurate. You can find many articles and papers discussing great rejuvenation, but none mention dominating the world as the number one superpower. It's not in Chinese culture, nor is it listed in the Chinese dream. We should not fall into these perceptions or negative traps. For example, the three dimensions of the Sino-European relationship. We all know there are many differences between China and the EU. They've always been there and haven't changed much since Sino-EU relations were established. But if we put these differences into a strategic guide, they could seduce people to focus on the differences and turn their policies more defensive, rather than cooperative. Also, regarding the decoupling between China and the USA, in my view, there's no "coupling" between China and the USA. There's always been De-Risking. If you emphasize De-Risking, perhaps the real "risking" will emerge.

Secondly, I think we could explore some areas that urgently need global governance. Like the professor mentioned about nuclear weapons. In today's world, the threshold for using nuclear

weapons seems to be declining rapidly. Nuclear proliferation seems unstoppable. We need a new mechanism to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. I was afraid when someone said the nuclear age is coming. It's very dangerous. Another area to consider is AI. One of the reasons I think Ukraine resisted the powerful Russian attacks, and why Hamas challenges the dominance of the Israeli army, is the joint participation in the world. If wars increasingly resemble media games, conflicts could erupt anytime, anywhere. There's an old saying that the earth turns with or without you. I sincerely hope that won't be the destiny of human beings. Thank you. That's all.

Tim Summers

Assistant Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; former Chatham House Consultant Fellow



I want to comment a little bit on the concept of pluralization. And I think this is a very powerful concept for the reasons that you set out earlier, Colin. I think it does a lot more conceptually for us than the idea of multipolarity, and it helps cope with the century of complexity and uncertainty that we're currently facing. It seems good as a method, as a sort of intellectual method, but also as a policy approach to bring more players into the discussion.

I think it can also operate as a norm, which is the subject of this current panel. You know, it's a good thing in its own right.

And based on that, I had two slightly granular comments relating to your initiative. The first of those, if you don't mind me making this comment, is I just wonder if the name "China-West Dialogue" really does justice to the richness of the concept of pluralization. It sounds a little bit binary and perhaps a little constraining. So, I wonder if, in a further development, you've got a way of headlining that notion of pluralization a little more. I confess I wasn't very familiar with your initiative until the preparation for this meeting.

[**Colin Bradford:** Let me just respond to that straight away. First of all, I mentioned this morning that we founded this in 2019, with eleven people in the room, one of whom was Nicolas Veron. They were all from France. And he immediately objected to this, and with good reason. But we sort of ploughed ahead, and it seemed not to detain us too much. However, what happened later was it came up again, maybe provoked by Nicolas or not—I can't remember who provoked it at that point. And a few of us did spend an hour or two kinds of thrashing it out, trying to think of something else. To make a long story short, we just couldn't find anything else that was better. But it is problematic, and we understand what you mean, so...]

Well, thank you, Colin. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to think of anything better myself. So, I can't contribute more meaningfully to that discussion now. But my second comment, I think, on the outline—the one-page outline—you have a reference to establishing dialogues to replace confrontational narratives. And I think that is an incredibly good and important objective. But for the reasons that many people have outlined here, including the excellent comments from our previous speaker, Mr. Chen Yang, confrontational narratives are not going to go away. They won't be replaced. They're not, unfortunately, replaceable for reasons of domestic politics, for reasons of international structure, interests of power, and so on. I wonder if the concept of pluralization can be applied to this. Rather than replacing confrontational narratives, we might seek to find ways to pluralize the narratives that exist.

Clearly, those narratives are very negative about China in Europe at the moment. I entirely agree with the previous speaker on that. But trying to find space and encouraging a broader range of narratives is essential. There are alternative narratives, but they tend to be at the opposite end of the spectrum from the very negative ones. There's not much in the middle. There's not much space in the middle. And those of us who sometimes try to occupy that space with things we say often find it very challenging. So, pluralizing narratives, I believe,

might be a more realistic and, in the long term, perhaps a more productive goal than trying to replace them with dialogue or alternative narratives. I apologize for being slightly granular on your concept note, but I found it very inspiring. I believe the concept of pluralization holds significant power, and I wish you every success with the initiative. Thank you, Colin.

Gladden J. Pappin

President, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs



I just wanted to put one additional topic forward, not to open another aspect of discussion. But when we talk about international norms and sustainable development, I think from the Hungarian perspective, one issue that has typically been missing in those conversations, but it's an issue that we encounter directly and tried to come up with a solution for, is demography and family formation.

A society that is forming families, in which people are having children, is a growing society and one which can be more economically dynamic. A society where families are not forming and where children are not being born and raised, is one that becomes more sclerotic and more oriented toward a different type of industrial production, toward medical services and things like that. And this does, I think, relate to, I think for the most part, it's been considered

a part of domestic policy, you know, what are the policies that a country pursues in order to incentivize family formation, family stability, etc.

But I think it should actually be considered as at least one aspect of international discussion. And I think if we check back in on this conversation five or ten years from now, by that point it will be and so we might as well go ahead and start to think about it a little bit now. I mean, through most of human history, family formation and the production and raising of children has just been taken as a given, as an input. And if anything, in the latter part of the 20th century, international institutions were a little bit more oriented toward concern about overpopulation. And there was a thought that maybe migration is something that could solve this problem. Because there are some parts of the world whose industrial development is inadequate to their population. And there are other parts of the world that, the Western parts of the world, are not forming families and children as frequently.

Hungary encountered this problem because we had a declining birth rate from the middle of the 1970s until 2010, and the country was basically bleeding population. And so we reoriented our social services systems to promote marriages and family formation. There has been an almost 90% increase in the number of marriages per year in the last 15 years. So I don't want to go on a long rant about this, but I think it is something that's worth considering because, if we think about geopolitical conflict, I don't have a well-worked-out theory about this, but it seems that there's something to it that an aging society is more averse to risk, it's more inclined to hoard its wealth and try to keep that for itself and pass it on, a younger society, at least in an industrially successful place, has a more risk-taking, more conceivably, it could have a more positive approach.

So again, I haven't thought it through, but I do just wonder if some of the urged word, you know, decoupling, de-risking, and the divergence and separation of the world economy is motivated in part by this fear. But anyway, for that reason, and a lot of other reasons, I think in the future, this topic will probably have a place in our discussions.

Peter Walker

Co-Chair, China Institute in America



Well, let me tell you just a little bit about my background. I spent many years at McKinsey focused on business. I did over 80 trips to China, serving many Chinese SOEs in the financial services world. And I never was an author, and I wasn't inclined to write. But I got so tired of every time I came over, reading the US press, and what was said about China and how naive and wrong it was. So, I wrote a book called "Powerful, Different, Equal."

Long story short, when I put it on the market in the US, my royalties took me out to dinner at a mid-sized restaurant with no wine in Manhattan. There was no interest. I went to The Times, I went to the Journal, I went to the FT, which I thought were pretty thoughtful editorials. The response was always the same; there's no market in our audience to hear that story. So, I had it translated into Mandarin; it actually did very well in China, not because it was pro-China, simply because it was balanced.

So, on this whole issue of what can be done constructively on the relationship? I think one hidden asset we have that could be tapped much more aggressively. I spent a lot of time with senior executives in the US over my career. They are by and large totally opposed to what the US is doing to the China relationship. But it's so polarized from a political point of view that

every time I finish up a conversation, the response is, "don't use our name." But if you look at the long-term interest of these corporations, they have a lot of clout, they have a lot of market presence, they have a lot of capital, they want to come to China. And they're hesitant right now. Why? Because they want stability for a long-term investment. They are very nervous about the whole issue of favoring SOEs at the expense of private enterprise, even though private enterprise accounts for over 100% of the wealth creation in China over the last ten years. But they would be ready allies. They would like to see a much more laser-focused approach to national security, a much more laser approach to tariffs that met genuine security needs, as opposed to things that were basically political in nature. So, I think that could be a very important source of support once we get through the election in the US, and it's no longer the hot topic of the day.

The last thing I'll say is what would be helpful on both sides of the equation. First of all, the US really should stop lecturing China on its domestic policies. All it does is anger China. It has absolutely no positive impact on anything. And the other thing is, China just needs to be sensitive to every time they criticize the US; the media completely eats it up, and it's all over the papers. And so for all the people that you would want to influence over time, every comment about the US being in decline, whether it's true or not, or any other criticism, is just feeding the flames, and it's very counterproductive. Okay, that's all I wanted to say.

Richard Walker

Chief International Editor, Deutsche Welle



Just by way of introduction, I don't think I'm in the pamphlet. I was a late confirmer, but I'm Richard Walker with Deutsche Welle in Berlin. And I just want to make a comment and then lead to a question about self-reflection. And this was kind of prompted partly by a couple of people here mentioning that they attended the Global Solution Summit, which Christian Kastrop referred to just earlier, where I had the pleasure of interviewing Chancellor Scholz on the stage. And as an opening question, with the Ukraine war hanging in the air, I asked him, "As the West, as Germany and other Western countries, try to seek support in the global South for their position over Ukraine, do they need to look themselves in the mirror about what they did in Iraq, what they did in Afghanistan? Is it time to think about even saying sorry?"

This got quite a response, and a couple of people here have mentioned this to me. Chancellor Scholz did start talking about the West having to avoid double standards. That was a moment of self-reflection and self-criticism from Scholz, which I found very interesting. Okay, what does this have to do with today? Well, I've been listening during the course of the day, and I've been really struck that there has been a lot of criticism of the United States. You would

almost get the impression that it's only the United States' fault that the relationship between the US and China is so bad. But that cannot be. There's also been a lot of self-criticisms from the United States and other Western delegates here, which I think is appropriate. Self-reflection and self-criticism are good, but I haven't heard that from the Chinese hosts. I haven't heard that from Chinese delegates here. And I'd be very interested, maybe moving into tomorrow, in the discussions tomorrow, to hear from Chinese delegates. Do you feel that there are areas where China has made mistakes, where it could have acted better, where it could have acted more constructively? It's a big question to raise at the end of the day, maybe something to take into tomorrow. I'll certainly be listening and curious to hear what people say. Thanks.

Julia Ganter

Programme Director International Affairs; Editor-in-Chief, The Berlin Pulse, Körber-Stiftung



Maybe it's a good moment for me to talk, because I'm German, and I can maybe represent a little bit the discourse in Germany.

As you've mentioned, there is quite some self-reflection going on at the moment. And I think, actually, it's a good moment to talk about how we will make multilateralism work in a multipolar world. This is especially the question that is being asked in Berlin at the moment. It was a question that was also raised by the Chancellor in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September in New York. But when I was reading the description for this panel, I was asking myself, should we really think about alternative platforms of multilateralism? We have quite a few. Shouldn't we rather think about potential areas of cooperation between China and Europe on the existing platforms that we already have?

Another experience from Germany is that our Western-led alternative platforms haven't really been a big success. I just want to mention the climate club, for example. There are many countries in the global South that did not really pick up on this idea, and the reason is that they don't feel they want to align in any of those camps. So, I think, why should China care about reforming these international multilateral platforms? I mean, China is part of BRICS, and we've seen BRICS expansion. It looks like quite a successful moment for BRICS. Why should China care when they are part of these existing alternatives? I think China should care together with us because if we want to engage more with our partners in the global south, and "global partnerships" is quite a buzzword at the moment in Berlin, then it should also be in China's interest to not make these countries pick a side. I think that should be a big motivation to really work together.

And I can imagine that some European colleagues might wonder how this fits into a narrative that we have of China, not only as a partner but also as a competitor and a systemic rival. So how can we work together with a systemic rival on our international system? But I don't think, at least from a German perspective, that this is the reason why we couldn't work together on international reforms. So, maybe one last word: I think to do this, both sides have to make concessions. Germany, for many years, has been trying to advocate for its own permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. From what I've heard in the speech, I haven't talked to officials about it, but it seemed the Chancellor was rather focusing on not a permanent seat, but to support others in non-permanent seats. One concession Germany could make is to focus on campaigning for others to join the United Nations Security Council. It looks like an expansion of existing formats like G20, and BRICS is quite a trend at the moment. Why not consider a P5+? Why not engage China and also Germany and other European partners in a P5 expansion? I think Joe Biden has already campaigned for a Latin American country to join the group.

I know it's a big endeavor, and many people think it's not possible. But I think, at least from a European perspective, from a German perspective, the global partnership outreach is quite significant at the moment, so there might be a window of opportunity to campaign for this idea, at least. Thanks.

ZHANG Wei

Co-Director, Professor of Law at Institute for Human Rights, China University of Political Science and Law



I've been abroad three times this year, twice in Geneva and one time in Oslo this year. I feel a very big problem that, we, which is very different from before the pandemic, that, we had many discussions around the globe with many different countries. But now I feel that many countries are closing their doors in many aspects. And I think that the relationship between China and the international society is becoming a very politically sensitive issue, even among scholars, which is a pity.

Scholars should be open to all discussions and suggestions. So, in this regard, I really very much want to thank Mr. Wang for organizing this forum. And this is probably the first time

for human rights scholars to participate in a forum. When you talk about international relations, human rights are, of course, a part of international relations.

For a long time, China has been a very big target for international criticism. But on the other hand, we have to see that China has been growing also from international criticism. And also, we learn a great deal from other countries for the past over 40 years. I personally participated in all kinds of international conferences, for over 24 years-time. I have to be frank with you that most of the time, China is a focus for criticism, but we learn from that. And for the past years, China has changed a lot in our legislation, in our legal practice, to catch up with international standards. For that reason, China has been upholding UN standards for the past over 40 years, over 50 years-time to learn from the international society. And we benefit from this learning process, and I hope that will continue in this regard.

And in the past several months, I have been reaching out to try to organize international conferences on human rights. But unfortunately, I see all the blocks. Every time I reach out to different friends around the world, they are telling me that: sorry, my friend. Not a good time. Because now we don't want to be criticized by the media because every time you have any contacts with China, then you will suddenly become a media focus for criticism. So many of my friends said no, no, let's wait until the time is right. So, I hope that through this forum, we are able to create a healthy atmosphere for international exchange dialogue, instead of blocking all the ways for China. Thank you.

Agnes Michalik

Managing Director, The Global Solutions Initiative



Thank you so much. Yes, I'm from the Global Solutions Initiative, and we've already heard something about it. So, I wanna make it quite short, and maybe with all the, I would say, challenges that we've heard about today.

I would like to maybe end on a very hopeful note, and I think this also reflects some of the conversations that we had in Berlin in April together. I think we also hear that we can all agree that there are major challenges that we have to face globally, that we share and that we need to find common solutions for. And we've talked about climate being the obvious one. We talked about digital. But there's also food security, there's financing, the global commons, and there's health. And I think, from our perspective, we need to maintain the global platforms and the dialogues open. And I think having think tanks and engagement groups on board is a really, really good example of that, because we can see their sway also within the G20, that the G20 is not only the G20, it's all the engagement groups around them, it's think tanks, it's civil society organizations. And I think that is a really, really good starting point to solve the issues that we have and to maintain the cooperation open. And I think this is also what the Global Solutions Initiative stands for. Thank you.

Mabel Lv Miao

Secretary General of CCG



I'm so delighted to see so many international scholars and think tanks gathered here for our International Think Tank Innovation Summit. And I should say, thank you, and congratulations to CWD as well Colin. Finally, we make this happen through our Boston dialogue, through our Berlin dialogue, through our so many webinars. Today we talk about multilateralism. What is the alternative international cooperation platform? I think we have existing plan for like UN, like G20, G7, and BRICS, a lot of those dominated and emerging platform. But from my perspective, I think people can pay more attention on the young people, young generation, and the women's part. I would like to propose two points.

The 1st one is like Shada mentioned, the young generation. Of course, we should address the dominated power, like the existing think tanks and many platforms, as I mentioned. But like the young generation, we know that Julia from Körber Foundation is also the young leader of Munich Security Conference. I'm also the founder of GYLD, Global Young Leaders Dialogue. Both platforms are platforms for young people engagement. And I also know the

Global Solution, you have a very great platform for young people to engage with each other. And this is the platform category for young people to talk with each other.

And I think, what is our measure? What are our standards for young people's engagement? I think SDG itself is a basic consensus for global community, voted by all the UN members. I think we can talk more about SDGs, how to achieve that. Of course, people sometimes say, oh, the people to people exchanges, those topics are not so sexy, not so hot topic. But I think it's basic topic and we should improve it and do something for that. I think today we engage so many scholars and think tanks itself is a multilateralism success. So that's why I say congratulations to Colin and CWD. In the future, maybe you can get more young people to participate. Secondly, this morning I was not here because I'm the delegate of the 13th National Women's Congress in China. All the political bureau, standing members of CPC participated. So, the CPC and Chinese government paid a lot of attention on the women's leadership and women's rights in all fronts. And this morning the Congress also urge all the Chinese female do our best, try our best to tell the true stories of what happened in China, and the women's true stories in the path of China's modernization to the world. So, we should conduct more engagement and international cooperation with the world. People will ask a question: why CCG can gather so many international experts today, physically here? Let me tell you a secret. The secret is that in the past few years, during pandemic, we are still very active around the world to meet with so many scholars face to face and invite most of you face to face. This is the secret of the people to people exchange. This is the secret of our common mission to build up the Global Committee for the Humankind of Shared Future. I think this is the basic rule for our dialogue. That's why I would like to call for more than engagement. And finally, I would like to say the think tanks exchange itself. It's so important and plays a significant role for our global governance. Like this month, we an invited delegation of American young politician visited CCG office. We had an in-depth dialogue. Those people are the bipartisan delegates of the legislative young staff of congressmen and senators of US. Those people ask a lot of questions to our counterparts of young Chinese "think tankers", e.g., they ask BRI, they are so interested in what happened in the BRI. And we answer the question, and the further question related to the three initiatives initiated by China, including the Global Civilization Initiative for Security and Development initiatives. So, on surface maybe in English media. Those people are not so interested in our Chinese policies and new platform initiated by Chinese government and Chinese side as Chinese think tanks. But through that kind of young generation's dialogue, I found that those people are so

interested in our initiatives and the international norms initiated by Chinese side. So maybe all of us should be observers to see what happened in the future and build up new platform for the global engagement. So, thank you again. And I would like to express my gratitude to all of our participants. Thank you again.

