Transcript of Middle East Panel 2: A peaceful, prosperous, stable nuclear free Middle East for all: Possible?
Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, diplomats, and think tankers concentrate on the nuclear capabilities of Israel and the potential for nuclear programs in Iran and Saudi Arabia.
On May 25th and 26th, 2024, the 10th China and Globalization Forum, hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), co-organized by the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), and supported by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS), was held in Beijing.
Below is the full transcript of the special forum "A peaceful, prosperous, stable nuclear-free Middle East for all: Possible?" CCG has published its video recording on Chinese social media, where it remains accessible. The video recording has also been posted on CCG's YouTube channel.
The transcript hasn’t been reviewed by the speakers and may contain errors.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation moderated the roundtable.
The keynote speakers are, by order of appearance,
Kazem Sajjadpour, Former president of the Institute for Political and International Studies
Hussein Mousavian, Middle East & Nuclear Policy Specialist, Princeton University
Khalid Fahad Al Khater, Director of Policy & Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar
Unal Cevikoz, Former Ambassador of Turkiye to Iraq
Qin Tian, Deputy Director and Associate Research Professor, Institute Of Middle East Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
Zoon Ahmed, Research Fellow, CCG
HRH Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
I will not make any introductory remarks, because we just haven't got the time for those. So, I would like to go straight into the panel questions.
The framing question is already been put in your briefing memoranda. So, I will start by asking Kazem Sajjadpour two questions. If he could focus on those, it would be hugely helpful.
Question No. 1 is that the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa that basically says that it is not permissible under Islamic doctrine to engage in nuclear warfare that results in indiscriminate killing. Now, if in the next few weeks, months, or years, it turns out that the Middle East is going to be nuclear, then is there scope for reviewing this fatwa? More importantly, in case we have, God forbid, a new supreme leader, then is there place to revise the fatwa on this issue or not?
My second question to you is going to be that now we have seen, April 14, an exchange between Iran and Israel, should Israel be allowed to retain its nuclear weapons? Then Iran, because of its interest in deterring any future attacks on Iran from Israel, will this also precipitate, as Mr Kharazi said in a speech, that this could actually precipitate Iran developing nuclear weapons? Those are two questions for you, please, sir.
Kazem Sajjadpour, former president of the Institute for Political and International Studies
First of all, let me thank you and also CCG for this very wonderful conference. Seeing friends and colleagues is really a source of pleasure.
On your question, I think Iranian policy on that fatwa and the nuclear issue has remained the same. There is no change in Iranian policy, and it's a principle policy.
But on the question of Israel, I think because it was mainly, let's say, a question at this conference: Is a stable, prosperous, nuclear-free Middle East possible or not?
I think this question somehow encompasses the other dimensions of the issue of nuclearization of the Middle East. My answer to this question is "Yes, Why Not, But."
Yes, I think the Middle East can be prosperous, peaceful, stable, and nuclear-free because there is nothing structurally wrong with the people in the Middle East. That's very important. We are normal human beings as any part of the world. The structure imposed on the Middle East is the source of the problem. That is, of course, the legacy of colonialism and what is evolving out of colonialism. So, I think if the situation is somehow suitable, a nuclear-free Middle East zone can also be declared as Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa was declared.
But the problem is why the situation is as it is today and if there has been any improvement on the issue of declaring the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone. My answer to this very specific question or how to understand the issue of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons. I think ABC, very quickly.
A -- Attempts have been done and followed during the last 50 years. From the day that Iran and Egypt in August 1974 jointly tabled the resolution in the United Nations, other countries joined. Still, this resolution is repeated each year and all the Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of the Zionist entity, abide by this resolution. And I think it's a very valid resolution.
Furthermore, from the time that -- of course, Professor Musavian is an expert on this issue, he would be very detailed -- on the issue of renewal of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). There was an understanding that there could be a conference on the destruction of all weapons of mass distraction (WMD) in the Middle East. It was a type of compromise for extending the NPT. Their conference was held with a lot of difficulties. The U.S. pushes, let's say, problems. Of course, the U.S. has accepted the formula, but this conference in one way or the other is an attempt. At the last meeting, they had their workshop, I mean, their frameworks. Furthermore, in these attempts that we can mention and refer to, we have IAEA also. What's interesting is civil society. Disarmament society also has clear attempts in this regard. So, attempts for a nuclear-free Middle East are clear.
B -- Barrier. There is a barrier clearly; that is Israel. Israel is the main barrier. Why? Because first of all, it is the most abnormal actor in the Middle East. Now, I'm not using rhetoric. It is abnormal in the sense of its borders, its grabbing the territory, more importantly, its nuclear posture -- a nuclear rhetoric. Recently, one of their ministers threatened that the Israelis were going to use a nuclear weapon against Gaza Palestinians, which really created a shock not just in the Middle East but globally.
Furthermore, on the barrier, you have to see that the U.S. support for Israel, even on the issue of nuclear ambiguity and nuclear, let's say, the backing is there. That's very interesting. The American Administration during Obama published its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Based on that Posture Review, the U.S. is ready to give nuclear security assurances to the non-nuclear states with the exception of two in the report. That is Iran and North Korea.
So I think this is really a barrier, that's how they approach and the treatment that they had to the Iranian nuclear file compared to the nuclear file of Israel. I think it is reflective of a diverse, standard policy. It is a barrier.
Now my C, which I end, there are common grounds that make the Middle East more peaceful, prosperous, and nuclear-free. How? I think the first is bilaterals. When you have good bilaterals, the ground is much better for peace, security, and prosperity. As was reflected and mentioned during the last two days, the Iranian-Saudi relationship really is contributing to regional peace and security. Second, on the regional level, I think there are enough institutions like OIC, Arab League, or others that can really help regional thinking on this equation. But finally, more importantly, it is global efforts, which I think is also a ground we should explore. However, to finish, I think the attempt should be appreciated.
A, B -- barrier is support for Israel --and C, there are so many common grounds to be explored. And let me assure that Iran is not for nuclear weapons as is reflected in reports and so on and so forth. However, the psychology of the region is impacted by Gaza. And you see in Gaza, it is not Iran, it is not any other regional players. It is Israel, which is the main barrier to peace and security.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much, Mr. Sajjadpour, for your remarks from the perspective of Iran. I would now like to ask Mister Mousavian. Mousavian for many years has been advising the Iranian government on the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) issues. We do not want to go into the history of the JCPOA because that is very well known -- who signed up for it, who then decided to break it up, and all that. So that's all the past.
I would like to ask a very specific question to Mister Mousavian. If the Iranian government, the U.S., and the E3 were basically giving Iran a choice. Choice No.1 is that you stop enriching uranium, you stop your weapons program. In return, we will lift all the sanctions but there is a further condition, that you need not interfere anymore in Arab affairs and we will stop all sanctions against you. How would the trade-off on the cost and benefit analysis be reviewed by Iran?
The alternative would be that Iran is said to join the nuclear club. There are nine members of this club. Six or five of them were admitted with consent. India and Pakistan gatecrashed the system. North Korea gatecrashed the system. Israel has always been a member. Iran is told to join the club, but the price for joining is that you have to stop regional interference. You can be a member of the club and you should start to behave responsibly. Which direction would you advise the Iranian government to take?
Hussein Mousavian, Middle East & Nuclear Policy Specialist, Princeton University
First of all, let me extend thanks to Mohamed, the CCG, and the Amersi Foundation for the invitation and for managing such a great forum.
The fact about nuclear-weapon-free zones is that this initiative is 50 years old and failed. Zero progress during 50 years. The WMD-Free Zone adopted by the UN is about 30 years old and has failed completely. The key reason, as Kazan said, is that Israel is the only country in the region with a nuclear bomb not accepting membership of NPT and is going to neither accept NPT nor give up the nuclear bomb. Therefore, if you are talking or discussing the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, no other country has nuclear weapons. And as long as Israel is going to continue to keep the exclusivity of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, we are not going to have a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
The second issue is about the content of NPT and WMD conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Biological Diversity, and NPT. In every Convention, you have commitments versus rights. Every member is committed to complying with all duties to ensure no nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. In return, the members would be able to enjoy the full rights to peaceful technology.
Iran has been a member of all three WMD conventions. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has been deprived of all rights. If there is ambiguity about nuclear, there has never been ambiguity about the Chemical Weapons Convention or Convention on Biological Diversity. But Iran has been deprived of peaceful biological and chemical technologies.
Therefore, here is a big question for the future of the Middle East: Whether the members of Middle Eastern countries are going to be committed to weapons of mass destruction conventions or not. If they are going to be committed, it cannot be only a one-way street--commitments without rights. This has been completely implemented about Iran.
The third issue is you mentioned JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). The fact is that JCPOA was NPT 2.0. JCPOA contains the most comprehensive transparency and inspection measures and mechanisms during the history of nonproliferation. The JCPOA contains the most comprehensive limits assuring nondiversion toward weaponization. It is an agreement in which the five permanent members agreed with Iran. UN Resolution 2231 was adopted. IAEA resolutions were adopted.
For three years, Iran fully complied with zero failure and the US cheated. And the U.S. withdrew. It doesn't matter. Trump is the President of the United States, not the Iranian president. That's why there is a question here. Even if you have NPT 2.0, even if you have the highest level of transparency measures beyond NPT, and even if a member is in full compliance, then can you guarantee that such an agreement would continue? No.
The third very important consequence of the withdrawal of Trump or the U.S. from JCPOA is the fact that when Iran complied with the highest level of transparency measures, which no other member of NPT during the history of nonproliferation has ever accepted, and the most limits which no other member of NPT has ever accepted such limits. When Iran was in full compliance, Iran was rewarded with the most comprehensive sanctions ever after the Revolution.
Therefore, to me, maybe here I have a little bit, of a different view with my friend Hassan. I really don't know how far Iran would continue to be a member of NPT, not possess a nuclear bomb, and be rewarded with the most comprehensive sanctions. For another 40 years? I don't believe so. I believe as long as during Ali Khamenei era, Iran is not going to divert, except if Iran is attacked. But nobody knows what after. Either world powers should rethink the treatment of Iranians toward nonproliferation, NPT, or conventions of weapons of mass destruction, or I'm not sure in the future Iran will continue the 40 years they have experienced.
Finally, Iran has reached two weeks' breakout. In case there is an attack, to my understanding, Iranians would change their strategy. Even during Ali Khamenei's era.
The second fact is that nuclear deterrence now is really under question because of the new developments, drones, and missiles. You know, Israel is experiencing how far these 90, 200, or 400 nuclear weapons can guarantee the security of Israel.
The other fact is that Saudi Arabia, to my understanding, very soon would have a full-fledged nuclear program, which is their right. Egypt would come after. Turkey would come after. It doesn't mean nuclear bombs, but they would have nuclear capability, which is positive, which is within NPT, which is the right of everyone. Either Israelis should rethink withdrawing from nuclear exclusivity or they should accept a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much, Mr Mousavian. Now we go to His Excellency, Khalid Khater from Qatar. He's in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And my question to him is very simple.
If despite all the efforts of the international community, Iran goes the full way and becomes a nuclear power, either as a gatecrasher or as an admitted member. And if Saudi Arabia, in its discussions with the United States, is allowed to develop its nuclear program for civilian use. And as we all know, all the programs start with the best of intentions with civilian use, and then they slowly evolve into weapons. What is going to be the position of Qatar? Is it prepared to allow certain states in the Middle East to be nuclear or will it say we also want to exercise our sovereign right to go nuclear as well?
Khalid Fahad Al Khater, Director of Policy& Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar.
Thank you very much. First of all, let me also extend my thanks to CCG, the leadership in CCG, and the Amersi Foundation for organizing this forum on the Middle East within this important conference.
I think the question you are raising emphasizes, I think, calls for looking at the broader picture in terms of what regional security is. The State of Qatar, along with our diplomatic partners in the region within the GCC and others, have long recognized the importance of this topic in our regional security agenda. In fact, we have worked diligently in the last few months and last year to really come together and discuss what regional security means for all of us as a group. Last March, actually, we announced a regional security paper, which underlines our current position in many of these issues.
So this is one of the first points we have to make. There was definitely a space given in our foreign policy agenda and diplomatic activity on this particular issue of creating the importance of a nuclear-free Middle East. And today, we see that the situation is exacerbated by many factors, which makes it even more dangerous.
The conflicts that have come and gone, and their flux not even within the Palestinian issue, but also regionally back and forth is really a very critical time for all of us. Many traditional assumptions, I think, in terms of the balance of power, deterrence, and proliferation are being compounded in these times. We have to recognize that at this point in time, there is one country that really has nuclear weapons, namely Israel, at this point, which makes this a very dangerous situation.
The threat of using nuclear weapons against other countries in the region, I think, is something that shows responsibility. But it also went on to threaten the use of nuclear attack against the Palestinian people and even some diplomats and some cultures. Even the West and the U.S. have come out with certain statements supporting such an act. So this makes it even more critical. Even the IAEA said at one point that an attack on some nuclear facilities in the region is a possibility.
So, the NPT system is really in critical times at this point, and I think it's important to look at it and strengthen it rather than just discarding it completely. I think this one system is important to really adhere to.
And Qatar. Last year we had a forum in which we had the representative countries and also the IAEA in which this particular issue was addressed, and many countries convened on this particular issue. I think this was an important timing for us. Of course, it was before all these events, but I think it underlines how we really support these efforts.
So for us, the issue of escalation has always been a consistent policy for many years. The issue of dialogue has been very important for us as a country in our foreign policy. Therefore, we think in terms of regional security as a comprehensive arrangement, and I think it has to take the effort of all the countries in the region to achieve that.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much, Your Excellency. I now turn the question to His Excellency Unal Cevikoz. Unal has had a distinguished career in the Turkish Foreign Office for 36 years, before retirement. So the question is the same one that we put to our Qatari colleague. If you see other states becoming nuclear, would Turkey say, well, we don't really need to, we are a member of NATO, so we can always rely on NATO members to come to our support in case it is warranted? Or would you say that you would like to exercise your independent sovereign right to become nuclear if others become nuclear as well?
Unal Cevikoz, Former Ambassador of Turkiye to Iraq
Thank you, Mohamed. First of all, let me greet His Royal Highness and the distinguished guests. Also, let me express my appreciation and gratefulness to the organization of this seminar by the CCG and the Amersi Foundation and inviting me to speak on this panel. It's a pertinent question. It is very important.
In the next room, a similar chaotic situation [Ukraine] is being discussed. The common denominator between the two cases is one of the parties which are involved is a nuclear power. President Putin has mentioned that he would not refrain from resorting to the use of nuclear bombs. And he has even instructed the Russian army to start exercises in the south of the country. And it is the same case with Israel. One of the ministers has also mentioned that Israel could resort to the use of nuclear power.
Now, it has been mentioned that Israel is the only country in the region with nuclear bombs and is refusing to become a party of the NPT. And of course, this is creating some serious frustration in all the countries in the region.
Why do countries need nuclear power? Israel probably needs it just because of proving that it has a deterrent power and it's a matter of security for Israel. But for the others, for example, we have been discussing the situation in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, they might be also interested in acquiring that capacity. They also have security concerns because they simply want to balance the situation with Israel. If Israel is remaining as the sole nuclear power in the region, then there's a security perception for all the other countries.
I think the use of nuclear energy is the right of each and every sovereign state. And frankly speaking, I think Turkey has a nuclear program. Turkey is already constructing with the participation of Russia at the Mediterranean coast the Mersin Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. The functioning of that plant will be operational probably in the year 2026. There is also a plan of the Turkish government that a second nuclear power plant is also probably going to be constructed at the Black Sea coast.
So Turkey has a nuclear strategy or nuclear plan to develop its energy production. In fact, in about 10 years' time, Turkey is planning to become capable of producing 10% of its national energy production through nuclear power plants.
So peaceful use of nuclear energy is, of course, the sovereign right of each and every country. And I think it is the same situation with the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates is also building a nuclear power plant in cooperation with South Korea. So we have to separate these issues. Iran also has a nuclear power plant and it is enriching uranium.
I have been personally involved in the process of negotiations during the JCPOA because, at that time, Turkey offered to store the excess amount of enriched uranium in Turkey produced in Iran. Unfortunately, the JCPOA has been canceled by President Trump. During President Biden's administration, there have been some attempts in the last four years but there has not been any kind of progress.
So when you ask the question if that kind of proliferation continues, if Iran chooses to become a nuclear power and if, as we hear and as we read from different sources, that Saudi Arabia is also interested in acquiring that kind of a capacity, what would Turkey do?
The question is, of course, very pertinent because the official response of the Turkish government will be Turkey is a member of NATO, and NATO has a deterrence policy. And in that deterrence policy, the use of nuclear power is a part of it. So in that sense, as a member of NATO, Turkey is covered by NATO's nuclear deterrence policy.
But if proliferation continues in the region and if many countries become nuclear powers, would that policy of Turkey continue to remain? That is the pertinent question, and I can't give an answer to that, of course. But when you look at the foreign policy decisions of the Turkish government when it comes to security matters, Turkey may also take certain sovereign decisions such as, for example, in spite of the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, Turkey has procured S-400 from Russia.
Turkey is a member of NPT. It has ratified the NPT. But of course, there is no guarantee that such a proliferation will change geopolitics in the region, and it will be difficult to ask whether Turkey will continue its policy as it is today. So what is the solution?
I think the keyword has been mentioned and pronounced several times during the two days of this conference, which is dialogue. We have to enhance dialogue and we have to assure mutual security to all the parties in the region. It is a matter of security for Israel because Israel's mere existence is challenged by either state or non-state actors in the region. It is also a matter of security for other countries such as Iran, for example, because it also perceives a threat from Israel just because they have nuclear weapons. So that kind of mutual security can only be guaranteed by enhanced action of important actors in the international community. And I think China also has a very important role to play because China is becoming more and more involved in Middle Eastern politics.
But let me also mention one thing, which is, you know, I was a member of Parliament from 2018 to 2023. For five years, I was representing the main opposition party, not the government party. But our party has developed a kind of an initiative which would start to establish a kind of a platform for big countries of the region to form a kind of an understanding between each other to tackle the problems, the main problems, which are terrorism and migration in the region.
Had we won the elections in 2023, of course, that would have been the priority of the Turkish foreign policy with the new government. But of course, the policy still remains and the party, the Republican People's Party pursues that policy. But this situation has been seriously undermined after the 7th of October in Gaza. So, in order to give mutually reassured security to all the actors in the region, I think first we have to stop the tragedy in Gaza and the war between Israel and Hamas. That's the reason why I think these two panels, the previous one and this panel, are in a way complementary to one another.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much for your very insightful comments. I would now like to turn to Mister Tian to really answer the question. So if my understanding is correct, during the JCPOA discussions, there was one thing that united the P5 and Germany, which is that they were somewhat against Iran being able to develop a nuclear weapon at that time. Therefore, there was a huge push for the JCPOA, sanctions relief, and all of it. But that was then. The world is a very different place today. And I, in my opening speech, referred to an acronym called CRINKS -- China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Three of those members are nuclear. And what is the China position in your view now? Would it soften its stance in case if the fourth member of CRINKS decides that they want to go nuclear, or would it still be an impediment to China to allow Iran to go nuclear?
Qin Tian, Deputy Director and Associate Research Professor, Institute Of Middle East Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
Thank you very much for the question. Firstly, I should thank the CCG and Amersi Foundation for providing this platform. I think it's a really very high-level platform. And it is not only the platform but also the colleagues here on the stage and under the stage.
For your question, I think first, I'm not an official representative of the Chinese government. You mentioned there is a saying firstly put out by US scholars, I think, The China, Russia, North Korea, Iran camp. There is something like a camp. I understand the logic of those who propose this camp, but I think the Chinese official policy is that we are still adhering to the non-alignment policy. So we are not proposing, promoting, or supporting any kind of camp, camping, or something like that. So I think to put China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran into a camp is not correct and too simplifying behavior.
And for the JCPOA, I think you mentioned that it's part of the history and it is gone. But as far as we are speaking now, I think we should reflect on the lessons of JCPOA's success and more importantly, its failure. I think there are two main lessons we should learn from the failure of the JCPOA.
The first is that you know, during Obama's time, his approach was to solve the Iran nuclear issue first and then to solve all the Iran-related issues. I mean, first nuclear, then so-called Iranian regional influence or Iran's missile problem, those kinds of issues. But in the end, we have seen that without solving all the related issues, we cannot alone solve Iran's nuclear issue. So maybe the other alternative in the future is that we should consider solving all the issues relating to Iran at the regional level, national level, or global level, then we can naturally lead to the solution to Iran's nuclear issue. That's the first reflection of me as a scholar.
The second is what the Chair also mentioned, Iran's nuclear issue is also linked closely with the global context. During Obama's time, there is generally coordinated effort by the P5+1. I think at that time, China and Russia were both coordinating with the United States about the sanction efforts. At that time, China and Russia were playing a very important mediating role in JCPOA talks. But gradually, in recent years, the great power coordination became a great power competition or great power rivalry. So you see right now, China and Russia are very strongly opposing the US unilateral sanctions. We are not in the framework of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Then, China and Russia's willingness to play a mediating role between the U.S. and Iran is also declining in recent years. It doesn't disappear -- I mean, China and Russia are still a channel between the U.S. and Iran for messaging -- but the willingness of these two powers to play a substantial role in mediating nuclear negotiations is declining. So that's why we should emphasize that there should be a more positive or friendly global environment to facilitate Iran nuclear negotiations.
If I should add a third level, that is the regional level. We have seen since the 7th of October event, since the Gaza conflict broke out, I think this is another hit on the JCPOA. So after the Gaza conflict, Iran's regional influence network is again showing its power in the Gaza conflict. They constitute many fronts in the Gaza conflict.
So I think that diminishes the hopes of reviving JCPOA during Biden's term. If we want to solve Iran's nuclear issue or revive JCPOA talks, it's also important to, I think, solve the regional issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. We haven't imagined that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict influenced the Iran nuclear talks to such an extent.
So in conclusion, I think the Chinese way of contributing to JCPOA is that we recognize that we should do a lot of efforts at the global level, at the regional level, not only in the negotiation track to help create a more friendly context or condition for the nuclear talks. So that's why China played an important role in facilitating the rapprochement between Saudi and Iran last March. That's the way China will continue to contribute to JCPOA.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much for your insightful remarks. Also, I highly appreciated Mr. Tian. I now turn to our last speaker on the panel, Zoon Ahmed. She's part of CCG. And the question I would put to her is, as I said in my opening remarks -- you're not speaking for Pakistan, I know that -- Pakistan gatecrashed the nuclear system. It was not invited and it was a reaction to India becoming nuclear in many ways. For Iran, there was a back and forth with Pakistan, as you know, after the terrorist attacks in Kerman. Iran fired some missiles and then Pakistan hit back quite hard. And after that, Iran drew a line and said, no, we have to stop this. Now, if Iran does want to do what Pakistan did, should Iran be stopped from doing it? Given that Pakistan gatecrashed, why should Iran not gatecrash as well?
Zoon Ahmed, Research Fellow, CCG
Thank you for the question. As long as I see, first of all, I resonate with all the other panelists when I say that it's a real privilege. And I think for our panel in particular, it has an ambassadors' panel, particularly, specifically talking about the region. So it is slightly, you know, intimidating to talk about these issues given that we really have one of the most experienced and most high-level gatherings present here, which is also a great opportunity to learn.
About your question, I mean, I think in general, firstly, let me start with a bigger context in which this meeting, the China and Globalization Forum, is taking place, which is really an understanding of what globalization means, why we should strive for it, but also, you know, questions of what is the international order, what is the global order? And I think one of the most -- it's a great privilege, you know-- for me personally to see a day but I thought was impossible 15 years ago when I was an undergraduate, maybe. But we have an opportunity to discuss in a place like Beijing in a very international setting, from a Middle Eastern perspective. And I'll just add that, the multipolarizing or multipolarizing world means for me, as it does for a lot of people, is the access to each other's perspectives, like the talk by His Excellency Prince Turki bin Faisal yesterday was also a recognition of what history, what civilization of any part of the world can really contribute, what it means to respect and understand one another. Dialogue is really the first key to that. So I feel immensely privileged to be here.
About your question, yes, I think it's important to understand the context in which India and then Pakistan did sort of gatecrash the system. I mean, there is no alternative, really. We in Pakistan might believe that one of the reasons a great war as it was back in 1948 was a war back in 1965 and 1971 when the partition of East and West Pakistan took place. I mean, no such major war has erupted between Pakistan and India since both have become nuclear powers. So that's where, you know, the logic of deterrence. We sort of justify that it has worked.
But that said, the concept of a nuclear-free zone in a region like the Middle East or generally in the world is something that is encouraged by the international community. It is not conducive for a region to need nuclear weapons in order to deter us from reaching that brink, that point where we might be completely at odds with each other. We don't recognize that. Basic peace, cooperation, and relations conducive to constructive relations with each other are the only way forward.
So, I think anyway, the world has changed since Pakistan and India took that step. I think I would recommend any of you to listen to that speech by Bhutto. At that time, he was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the General Assembly. Let me say that this is a double standard that has been imposed on Pakistan. At that time, the sentiment of certain double standards being imposed by countries that had nuclear weapons over those that did not was a strong sentiment. And at that time, I mean, there are political analysts that the historians study that maybe for India, the reason was China after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and then for Pakistan because since then we had deep political mistrust and lack of confidence in the platforms which could strengthen political positive relations between India and Pakistan, so this seems to be a logical step.
For Iran, I don't think that should be a context, so to speak. I think the world has come a long way. I think the real incentive for Pakistan and Iran is that, as you mentioned, we had that escalation fairly recently, but we also have seen improvements and China's positive role in facilitating better dialogue between Pakistan and Iran. So for example, last year in May, there was a China-led trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan, and Iran because there were some incidents happening: Balochistan is a province divided between both countries. The incidents occurred also because of some of the instability caused by the aftermath of the Afghan War. China's participation in strengthening mutual coordination between Iran and Pakistan also helped efforts to better communicate with Afghanistan.
So I think we are in a world where there are platforms. It's a more multipolar world where countries like Iran and countries in the region also have a force, like Mr Qin just mentioned, the Saudi Arabia and Iran detente also facilitated by China. It shows a political will in the region, in the Middle Eastern region, to really address the issues and a signal to all the countries in the region that we don't need to resort to this measure in order to make ourselves secure.
But I think all of the panels have really talked about, how the current escalation, this current Palestinian-Israeli war, what even I would call a genocide, is really a point to reflect the double standards that the Global South, if you want to call it, the non-Western world has always complained about. The way this current conflict in Gaza is being interpreted, the way it is being dealt with by certain governments that are not even mentioning it when they talk about the need to address maybe the Ukraine conflict, the fact that this issue is being ignored, and the fact that Israel has the privilege to follow a policy of nuclear ambiguity is the biggest issue in the region. It is not the misunderstanding between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan and Iran have political platforms, the willingness, and China's support to address these issues. Saudi Arabia and Iran, an issue that decades ago we thought was impossible. This was historic -- the detente that happened, and it has moved forward from there.
So I think the biggest issue we are facing is the issue of certain countries believing that they're above the law. And that is my initial comment on the international order versus the world order. The international order, when they talk about a liberal international order or a values-based international, we reject that notion because the reason to have international law is to make sure that countries are treated equally.
So the real trigger for the possibility of nuclear proliferation, in my view, is the current double standard that is manifesting in the region. And I think the growing role of the region to cooperate -- we see the ambassadors, we see representatives, we see the societies in the region working together -- might push us forward to reach a state where that double standard ceases to exist. Thank you.
Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation
Thank you very much, Zoon, for your helpful remarks. We will now open this panel to the floor. But before I do that, I would like to invite His Royal Highness if he wants to address some remarks. Please, we will bring the mic to you.
And the question that I would put to you is that we've just been discussing a domino effect, say, Israel stays nuclear, and as a result, Iran says we cannot have that, so we would also go nuclear however long it takes. Saudi Arabia exercises its absolute sovereign rights to want to do that as well, which it has the ability to do. The question is that if the United States was not willing to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in having that technology, the Saudi Arabian relationships with Russia, China, and even Pakistan are so good that they can procure that know-how from any of this and even eventually Iran. So how would Saudi Arabia react to all of this?
Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud
Thank you very much and thank you for the panel, for all the instructive discussion that has taken place. On the nuclear issue, I'd like to take another tag to answer your question, which is the issue of the NPT as a treaty and a binding treaty for all members that is being abrogated, not just by those who did not sign the NPT treaty, but also by the big powers who signed the NPT treaty.
The clauses of the NPT treaty lead to the disarmament of nuclear weapons from those who have them. So even the so-called permanent members of the UN Security Council are supposed to disarm themselves.
I think the time period was 20 years' time after the treaty was signed in 1962. So by 1982, there should have been a world free of nuclear weapons. So the gatecrashers are not only India and Pakistan and of course, Israel and North Korea, but those who have refused to close the gate completely, including the permanent members of the Security Council. That's one aspect.
Alas, we're way beyond that now. To talk about the JCPOA for Iran or any other arrangements that Saudi Arabia or other countries may have to pursue whether peaceful or non-peaceful measures to acquire nuclear technology and know-how, it is a Pandora's box that has been opened. And it is available to whoever has either good intentions or bad intentions.
The Kingdom has made clear that its intentions are good. And I think we have signed already all of the guarantees that are included in the NPT and NPT+, in order to go forward in acquiring the availability of nuclear development in Saudi Arabia, whether with the United States or with other ready providers of that technology.
The Kingdom will, as a result of its commitments to the NPT, not seek to go outside the members of the so-called accepted club of nuclear weapons holders, mainly the permanent members of the Security Council. That has been publicly stated in all of the official statements of Saudi Arabia.
However, there have also been public statements by Saudi officials that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. I don't think there has been any fog in that, that the issue can be interpreted one way or the other.
My point here is that we have to work to acquire, not just in our part of the world, but more importantly in our part of the world, a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. And I think the only way we can do that after all of that has happened in the past 80 years or so, is that there should be a Security Council resolution that imposes on the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction with guarantees from the permanent five members of the Security Council that those who adhere to this zone will receive economic and technical support to develop their peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and those who don't adhere to the imposition of a zone free of weapons will be sanctioned by the permanent members of the Security Council to include military sanctions as well.
I think that is the only fair way that you can level the playing field for everybody. No exceptions. Whether it is Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, or whoever is developing or has ambitions to develop that capability should be included in this zone that will be imposed by the permanent members of the Security Council. I think that's the only way we can guarantee, as I said, a fair level ground for everybody.
In this context, reference also has been made to the Gaza war as having an impact on this issue. And I think in order to achieve peace for Gaza and Palestine in general, there also has to be a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing on Israelis, the Palestinians, and the other members of the Arab League whose property is still occupied by Israel, like Syria and Lebanon.
And that piece coming from the Security Council should include the following guarantees.
First, those who do not accept the two-state solution will be excluded from any negotiations for a peace settlement in the Middle East. This will take care of anybody on either side, whether it is Hamas or the Israeli government, or whoever does not accept the two-state solution.
The second issue is to have a "Marshall Plan," as was mentioned, I think, in the earlier panel about reconstruction, not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank. Israel has been running rampant, not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank, in its destruction and acquisition illegally of territory on the West Bank. This Marshall Plan should include financial commitments from Israel, which has been destroying the property, territory, and infrastructure, not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank, and any other members of the Security Council, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, and anybody who wants to contribute to the reconstruction on both sides. So these two conditions, I think, should equally result from a United Nations Security Council resolution. And thank you for giving me the time to speak.